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The Last Judgment or The Day of the Lord is part of the eschatological world view of the .. In Judaism, beliefs vary about a last day of judgment for all mankind. Some rabbis hold that . The Anglican Catechist: Manual of Instruction Preparatory to Confirmation. London: Archived from the original on 11 April Wesley. According to the Sri Lankan census, Indian Tamils currently make up roughly one third .. This was the day the LTTE experienced its first death, when allowed into the patriarchal male echelons of decision making of the LTTE. ruthenpress.info, accessed 4 May Flanigan. of Tamil Nadu, consequent to creation of Fast Track Courts .. followed the judgment dated which was rendered in . day. (ii) Service paid from contingencies shall be in a type of work or job for which regular.
A distinctive feature of the Orthodox composition, especially in Russian icons, is a large band leading like a chute from the feet of Christ down to Hell; this may resemble a striped snake or be a "river of Fire" coloured flame red.
If it is shown as a snake, it attempts to bite Adam on the heel, but as he is protected by Christ is unsuccessful. The sequence of events according to the most commonly held belief is the annihilation of all creatures, resurrection of the body, and the judgment of all sentient creatures. It is a time where everyone would be shown his or her deeds and actions with justice.
The exact time when these events will occur is unknown, however there are said to be major  and minor signs  which are to occur near the time of Qiyammah end time.
It is believed that prior to the time of Qiyammah, two dangerous, evil tribes called Yajooj and Majooj are released from a dam-resembling wall that Allah makes stronger everyday. Also other signs like the blowing of the first trumpet by an archangel Israfil , the coming of rain of mercy that will cause human to grow from the last remain of a back bone.
It is one of the six articles of faith. The trials and tribulations associated with it are detailed in both the Quran and the hadith , sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. Hence they were added in the commentaries of the Islamic expositors and scholarly authorities such as al-Ghazali , Ibn Kathir , Ibn Majah , Muhammad al-Bukhari , and Ibn Khuzaimah who explain them in detail. Every human, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, is believed to be held accountable for their deeds and are believed to be judged by God accordingly.
Main article: Jewish eschatology In Judaism , beliefs vary about a last day of judgment for all mankind. Some rabbis hold that there will be such a day following the resurrection of the dead.
Others hold that this accounting and judgment happens when one dies. Still others hold that the last judgment only applies to the gentiles goyim and not the Jewish people. Each time a new Manifestation of God comes it is considered the Day of Judgement, Day of Resurrection, or 'the Last Hour'  for the believers and unbelievers of the previous Manifestation of God.
The Bab told of the judgment: "There shall be no resurrection of the day, in the sense of the coming forth from the physical graves.
Rather, the resurrection of all shall occur in the form of those that are living in that age. If they belong to paradise, they shall be believers, if to hell, they shall be unbelievers.
There is no denying that upon the Day of Resurrection, each and every thing shall be raised to life before God, may he be praised and glorified. For God shall originate that creation and then cause it to return. He has decreed the creation of all things, and he shall raise them to life again. God is powerful over all things. Also, in the Kitab-i-Iqan , Baha'u'llah revealed that every Dispensation's Messenger is rejected using the Scriptures of the past  because "every subsequent Revelation hath abolished the manners, habits, and teachings that have been clearly, specifically, and firmly established by the former Dispensation".
It is noteworthy to call to mind the Hadith of one who asked an A'immah about meeting the Qa'im. The Imam asked him if he knew who his Imam was to which the man responded "it is you".
All the Prophets of God have appeared there. It was submitted that if it is held that Part I applies to all arbitrations, i. It was also pointed out that since Section 9 and Section 17 fall in Part I, the same would not have any application in cases where the place of arbitration is not in India. It was emphasised that the legislature had deliberately not provided any provision similar to Section 9 and Section 17 in Part II.
It was also submitted that a plain reading of Section 9 makes it clear that it would not apply to arbitrations which take place outside India. It was further submitted that Section 9 provides that an application for interim measures must be made before the award is enforced in accordance with Section 36 , which deals with enforcement of domestic awards only. On the other hand, provisions for enforcement of foreign awards are contained in Part II.
It was submitted that Section 9 does not talk of enforcement of the award in accordance with Part II. It was further submitted that there should be minimum intervention by the Courts in view of the underlying principle in Section 5 of the Arbitration Act, On the other hand, the respondents therein had made the submissions, which are reiterated before us. In Paragraph 14 of the Judgment, it is held as follows: Further it is also held that the Arbitration Act , no where provides that its provisions are not to apply to international commercial arbitrations which take place in a non-convention country.
Hence, the conclusion at Paragraph 14 a. On the basis of the discussion in Paragraph 17, this Court reached the conclusion recorded at Paragraph 14 b.
The conclusions at Paragraph 14 c is recorded on the basis of the reasons stated in Paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 22 and Upon consideration of the provision contained in Sections 2 7 , 28 , 45 and 54 , it is held that Section 2 2 is only an inclusive and clarificatory provision.
The provision contained in Section 9 is considered in Paragraphs 28, 29, 30 and It is concluded in Paragraph 32 as follows: It is concluded in Paragraph 37 as follows: As noticed above, the learned senior counsel for the appellants have supported the ratio of law laid down in Bhatia International supra and Venture Global Engineering supra.
In order to consider the issues raised and to construe the provisions of the Arbitration Act , in its proper perspective, it would be necessary to analyse the text of the Arbitration Act , with reference to its legislative history and international conventions.
We shall take due notice of the stated objects and reasons for the enactment of the Arbitration Act , Further, for a comprehensive and clear understanding of the connotations of the terms used in the Arbitration Act , , a brief background of various laws applicable to an International Commercial Arbitration and distinct approaches followed by countries across the world will also be useful. With utmost respect, upon consideration of the entire matter, we are unable to support the conclusions recorded by this Court in both the judgments i.
In our opinion, the conclusion recorded at Paragraph 14B can not be supported by either the text or context of the provisions in Section 1 2 and proviso thereto.
Let us consider the provision step- by—step, to avoid any confusion. A plain reading of Section 1 shows that the Arbitration Act , extends to whole of India, but the provisions relating to domestic arbitrations, contained in Part I, are not extended to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This is not a new addition. Even the Act states:. Thus, the Arbitration Act , maintains the earlier position so far as the domestic arbitrations are concerned. Thereafter, comes the new addition in the proviso to Section 1 2 , which reads as under:.
In our opinion, the proviso does not create an anomaly. The aforesaid Act is almost a carbon copy of the Act. Both the Act s do not make any provision relating to International Commercial Arbitration. Such a provision was made under the Arbitration Act , by repealing the existing three Acts, i. Therefore, the proviso has been added to incorporate the provisions relating to International Commercial Arbitration.
The provision contained in Section 2 2 is not affected by the proviso which is restricted to Section 1 2. By the process of interpretation, it can not be read as a proviso to Section 2 2 also. In view of the above, we are unable to discern any anomaly as held in Bhatia International supra.
We also do not discern any inconsistency between Section 1 and Section 2 2 of the Arbitration Act, In Bhatia International and Venture Global Engineering supra , this Court has concluded that Part I would also apply to all arbitrations held out of India, unless the parties by agreement, express or implied, exclude all or any of its provisions.
Here again, with utmost respect and humility, we are unable to agree with the aforesaid conclusions for the reasons stated hereafter. The aforesaid position, according to Mr. We agree with the submission of Mr. It clearly indicates that the Model Law has not been bodily adopted by the Arbitration Act , But that can not mean that the territorial principle has not been accepted. We would also agree with Mr. Sorabjee that it is not the function of the Court to supply the supposed omission, which can only be done by Parliament.
In our opinion, legislative surgery is not a judicial option, nor a compulsion, whilst interpreting an Act or a provision in the Act. The observations made by this Court in the case of Nalinakhya Bysack supra would tend to support the aforesaid views, wherein it has been observed as follows: Sorabjee has also rightly pointed out the observations made by Lord Diplock in the case of Duport Steels Ltd.
In the aforesaid judgment, the House of Lords disapproved the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in discerning the intention of the legislature, it is observed that: We are also unable to accept that Section 2 2 would make Part I applicable even to arbitrations which take place outside India. In our opinion, a plain reading of Section 2 2 makes it clear that Part I is limited in its application to arbitrations which take place in India.
We are in agreement with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondents, and the interveners in support of the respondents, that Parliament by limiting the applicability of Part I to arbitrations which take place in India has expressed a legislative declaration.
It has clearly given recognition to the territorial principle. The statement of the objects and reasons of the Arbitration Act , clearly indicates that law of arbitration in India at the time of enactment of the Arbitration Act , , was substantially contained in three enactments, namely, The Arbitration Act , ; The Arbitration Protocol and Convention Act, and The Foreign Awards Recognition and Enforcement Act , It is specifically observed that it is widely felt that the Arbitration Act , , which contains the general law of arbitration, has become outdated.
It also mentions that the Law Commission of India, several representative bodies of trade and industry and experts in the fields of arbitration have proposed amendments to the Arbitration Act , , to make it more responsive to contemporary requirements.
It was also recognized that the economic reforms initiated by India at that time may not become fully effective, if the law dealing with settlement of both domestic and international commercial dispute remained out of tune with such reforms.
The objects and reasons further make it clear that the general assembly has recommended that all countries give due consideration to the Model Law adopted in , by the UNCITRAL, in view of the desirability of uniformity of the law of arbitral procedures and the specific needs of international commercial arbitration practice. Paragraph 3 of the statement of objects and reasons makes it clear that although the UNCITRAL Model Laws are intended to deal with international commercial arbitration and conciliation, they could, with appropriate modifications, serve as a Model Law for legislation of domestic arbitration and conciliation.
Therefore, the bill was introduced seeking to consolidate and amend the law relating to domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration, enforcement of foreign arbitral award and to define the law relating to conciliation, taking into account the UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules.
Learned counsel for the appellants had canvassed that the Parliament had deliberately deviated from Article 1 2 of UNCITRAL to express its intention that Part I shall apply to all arbitrations whether they take place in India or in a foreign country. This indicates that applicability of Part I would not be limited to Arbitrations which take place within India.
Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that in case the applicability of Section 2 2 is limited to arbitrations which take place within India, it would give rise to conflict between Sections 2 2 , 2 4 , 2 5 , 2 7 , 20 and Whilst interpreting the provisions of the Arbitration Act , , it is necessary to remember that we are dealing with the Act which seeks to consolidate and amend the law relating to domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
The aforesaid Act also seeks to define the law relating to conciliation and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. It is thus obvious that the Arbitration Act , seeks to repeal and replace the three pre-existing Acts, i. Section 85 repeals all the three Acts. Earlier the Act catered to the arbitrations under the Geneva Convention. The domestic law of arbitration had remained static since Therefore, the Arbitration Act , consolidates the law on domestic arbitrations by incorporating the provisions to expressly deal with the domestic as well as international commercial arbitration; by taking into account the UNCITRAL Model Laws.
It is not confined to the New York Convention, which is concerned only with enforcement of certain foreign awards. It is also necessary to appreciate that the Arbitration Act , seeks to remove the anomalies that existed in the Arbitration Act , by introducing provisions based on the UNCITRAL Model Laws, which deals with international commercial arbitrations and also extends it to commercial domestic arbitrations.
Similarly, the Arbitration Act , has also adopted the territorial principle, thereby limiting the applicability of Part I to arbitrations, which take place in India. In our opinion, the interpretation placed on Article 1 2 by the learned counsel for the appellants, though attractive, would not be borne out by a close scrutiny of the Article.
Article 1 2 reads as under: The Indian legislature, while adopting the Model Law, with some variations, did not include the exceptions mentioned in Article 1 2 in the corresponding provision Section 2 2.
The relevant extracts of these paragraphs are as under:. The aforesaid position has been duly noticed by Howard M. Holtzmann and Joseph E. Dealing with the territorial scope of application of Article 1 2 at Pages 35 to 38, it is stated: We are also unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the Arbitration Act , does not make seat of the arbitration as the centre of gravity of the arbitration. Redfern in Paragraph 3. The arbitrators at times hold meetings at more convenient locations.
This is necessary as arbitrators often come from different countries. It may, therefore, on occasions be convenient to hold some of the meetings in a location which may be convenient to all. These observations were subsequently followed in Union of India Vs.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. It must be pointed out that the law of the seat or place where the arbitration is held, is normally the law to govern that arbitration. In fact, the Geneva Protocol states: The aforesaid observations clearly show that New York Convention continues the clear territorial link between the place of arbitration and the law governing that arbitration.
Just as the Arbitration Act , maintains the territorial link between the place of arbitration and its law of arbitration, the law in Switzerland and England also maintain a clear link between the seat of arbitration and the lex arbitri.
Swiss Law states: The article merely states that the Arbitration Law as enacted in a given state shall apply if the arbitration is in the territory of that State. For the reasons stated above, we are unable to support the conclusion reached in Bhatia International and Venture Global Engineering supra , that Part I would also apply to arbitrations that do not take place in India.
It is also missing in Section 2 1 of the Act U. The provision in Section 2 1 of the U. Act reads as follows: Therefore, we are in agreement with the submission made by Mr.
We do not agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that there would be no need for the provision contained in Section 2 2 as it would merely be stating the obvious, i. In our opinion, the provisions have to be read as limiting the applicability of Part I to arbitrations which take place in India.
As submitted by Mr. Sorabjee, another fundamental principle of statutory construction is that courts will never impute redundancy or tautology to Parliament. See observations of Bhagwati, J.
Raj Singh, wherein it is observed as follows: William Hill Park Lane Ltd. We quote the above in extenso only to demonstrate that Section 2 2 is not merely stating the obvious. Since the consolidated Arbitration Act , deals with domestic, commercial and international commercial arbitrators, it was necessary to remove the uncertainty that the Arbitration Act , could also apply to arbitrations which do not take place in India. Therefore, Section 2 2 merely reinforces the limits of operation of the Arbitration Act , to India.
Another strong reason for rejecting the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants is that if Part I were to be applicable to arbitrations seated in foreign countries, certain words would have to be added to Section 2 2. As very strongly advocated by Mr. It is not permissible for the court while construing a provision to reconstruct the provision.
In other words, the Court cannot produce a new jacket, whilst ironing out the creases of the old one. In view of the aforesaid, we are unable to support the conclusions recorded by this Court as noticed earlier. Is Section 2 2 in conflict with Sections 2 4 and 2 5 -. We may now take up the submission of the learned counsel that Sections 2 4 and 2 5 specifically make Part I applicable to all arbitrations irrespective of where they are held. This submission is again a reiteration of the conclusions recorded in Bhatia International at Paragraph 14C and reiterated in Paragraphs 21 and We have earlier held that Section 2 2 would not be applicable to arbitrations held outside India.
We are unable to accept that there is any conflict at all between Section 2 2 on the one hand and Sections 2 4 and 2 5 on the other hand. Section 2 4 provides as under:. In our opinion, the submission is devoid of merit.
The two sub-sections merely recognize that apart from the arbitrations which are consensual between the parties, there may be other types of arbitrations, namely, arbitrations under certain statutes like Section 7 of the Indian Telegraph Act, ; or bye-laws of certain Associations such as Association of Merchants, Stock Exchanges and different Chamber of Commerce.
Such arbitrations would have to be regarded as covered by Part I of the Arbitration Act, , except in so far as the provisions of Part I are inconsistent with the other enactment or any rules made thereunder. There seems to be no indication at all in Section 2 4 that can make Part I applicable to statutory or compulsory arbitrations, which take place outside India. Similarly, the position under Section 2 5 would remain the same.
In our opinion, the provision does not admit of an interpretation that any of the provisions of Part I would have any application to arbitration which takes place outside India. Section 2 5 reads as under: This sub-clause has been made subject to sub-clause 4 and must be read in the backdrop of Section 2 2 of the Arbitration Act, Section 2 2 of the aforesaid Act provides that this part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India.
Section 2 5 takes this a step further and holds that this Part shall apply to all arbitrations and proceedings relating thereto, where the seat is in India [a corollary of Section 2 2 ] and if it is not a statutory arbitration or subject of an agreement between India and any other country.
The exception of statutory enactments was necessary in terms of the last part of sub-clause 4 , which provides for non application of this Part to statutory arbitrations in case of inconsistency. Thus, barring the statutory enactments as provided for under Section 2 4 of the Arbitration Act, and arbitrations pursuant to international agreement, all other arbitration proceedings held in India shall be subject to Part I of the said Act.
Thus, the provision has to be read as a part of the whole chapter for its correct interpretation and not as a stand alone provision. There is no indication in Section 2 5 that it would apply to arbitrations which are not held in India.
In view of the aforesaid observations, we have no doubt that the provisions of Section 2 4 and Section 2 5 would not be applicable to arbitrations which are covered by Part II of the Arbitration Act, , i. We, therefore, see no inconsistency between Sections 2 2 , 2 4 and 2 5. For the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to agree with the conclusion in Bhatia International that limiting the applicability of part I to arbitrations that take place in India, would make Section 2 2 in conflict with Sections 2 4 and 2 5.
Does Section 2 7 indicate that Part I applies to arbitrations held outside India? We have earlier noticed the very elaborate submissions made by the learned senior counsel on the rationale, scope, and application of Section 2 7 , to arbitrations having a seat outside India. Having considered the aforesaid submissions, we are of the opinion that the views expressed by the learned counsel for the appellants are not supported by the provisions of the Arbitration Act , Section 2 7 of the Arbitration Act, reads thus:.
In our opinion, the aforesaid provision does not, in any manner, relax the territorial principal adopted by Arbitration Act , It certainly does not introduce the concept of a delocalized arbitration into the Arbitration Act , It must be remembered that Part I of the Arbitration Act, applies not only to purely domestic arbitrations, i.
This is clear from a number of provisions contained in the Arbitration Act , viz. Both the types of awards are liable to be challenged under Section 34 and are enforceable under Section 36 of the Arbitration Act, In other words, the provision highlights, if any thing, a clear distinction between Part I and Part II as being applicable in completely different fields and with no overlapping provisions.
Definitions contained in Section 2 i a to h are limited to Part I. From the aforesaid, the intention of the Parliament is clear that there shall be no overlapping between Part I and Part II of the Arbitration Act, The two parts are mutually exclusive of each other. This, in our opinion, was not the intention of the Parliament. The territoriality principle of the Arbitration Act , , precludes Part I from being applicable to a foreign seated arbitration, even if the agreement purports to provide that the Arbitration proceedings will be governed by the Arbitration Act , The additional submission of Mr.
Sorabjee is that Section 9-B of the Act, which was in negative terms, has been re-enacted as Section 2 7 of the Arbitration Act, in positive terms. Section 9- B of the Act, was as under:. We are of the opinion that the Section has been intentionally deleted, whereas many other provisions of the Act have been retained in the Arbitration Act , If the provision were to be retained, it would have been placed in Part II of the Arbitration Act, In our opinion, there is no link between Section 2 7 of the Arbitration Act, , with the deleted Section 9-B of the Act.
Western Company of North America supra were rendered. In both the cases the foreign awards made outside India were set aside, under the Act. By deletion of Section 9-B of the Act, the judgments have been rendered irrelevant under the Arbitration Act , Having removed the mischief created by the aforesaid provision, it cannot be the intention of the Parliament to reintroduce it, in a positive form as Section 2 7 of the Arbitration Act, We, therefore, see no substance in the additional submission of Mr.
We agree with Mr. Salve that Part I only applies when the seat of arbitration is in India, irrespective of the kind of arbitration. Section 2 7 does not indicate that Part I is applicable to arbitrations held outside India.
It appears to us that provision in Section 2 7 was also necessary to foreclose a rare but possible scenario as canvassed by Mr. In such a case, a claim could be made to enforce the award in India, even though the seat of arbitration is also in India. This curious result has occurred in some cases in other jurisdictions, e.
In the case of Bergesen Vs. Joseph Muller Corporation, the Court held an award made in the State of New York between two foreign parties is to be considered as a non- domestic award within the meaning of the New York Convention and its implementing legislation. Section 2 7 , in our opinion, is enacted to reinforce the territorial criterion by providing that, when two foreigners arbitrate in India, under a Foreign Arbitration Act , the provisions of Part I will apply.
We, therefore, have no hesitation in rejecting the submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the appellants, being devoid of merit. Learned counsel for the appellants have submitted that Section 2 1 e , Section 20 and Section 28 read with Section 45 and Section 48 1 e make it clear that Part I is not limited only to arbitrations which take place in India.
These provisions indicate that Arbitration Act , is subject matter centric and not exclusively seat centric. We are of the considered opinion that the aforesaid provisions have to be interpreted by keeping the principle of territoriality at the forefront. We have earlier observed that Section 2 2 does not make Part I applicable to arbitrations seated or held outside India.
In view of the expression used in Section 2 2 , the maxim expressum facit cessare tacitum, would not permit by interpretation to hold that Part I would also apply to arbitrations held outside the territory of India.
It appears to us that neither of the provisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants would make any section of Part I applicable to arbitration seated outside India. It will be apposite now to consider each of the aforesaid provisions in turn. Section 2 1 e of the Arbitration Act, reads as under:. It has a reference and connection with the process of dispute resolution. Its purpose is to identify the courts having supervisory control over the arbitration proceedings.
Hence, it refers to a court which would essentially be a court of the seat of the arbitration process. In our opinion, the provision in Section 2 1 e has to be construed keeping in view the provisions in Section 20 which give recognition to party autonomy. Accepting the narrow construction as projected by the learned counsel for the appellants would, in fact, render Section 20 nugatory. In our view, the legislature has intentionally given jurisdiction to two courts i.
This was necessary as on many occasions the agreement may provide for a seat of arbitration at a place which would be neutral to both the parties. Therefore, the courts where the arbitration takes place would be required to exercise supervisory control over the arbitral process. For example, if the arbitration is held in Delhi, where neither of the parties are from Delhi, Delhi having been chosen as a neutral place as between a party from Mumbai and the other from Kolkata and the tribunal sitting in Delhi passes an interim order under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, , the appeal against such an interim order under Section 37 must lie to the Courts of Delhi being the Courts having supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and the tribunal.
This would be irrespective of the fact that the obligations to be performed under the contract were to be performed either at Mumbai or at Kolkata, and only arbitration is to take place in Delhi. In such circumstances, both the Courts would have jurisdiction, i. The provisions contained in Section 2 1 e being purely jurisdictional in nature can have no relevance to the question whether Part I applies to arbitrations which take place outside India.
We now come to Section 20 , which is as under: Section 20 3 enables the tribunal to meet at any place for conducting hearings at a place of convenience in matters such as consultations among its members for hearing witnesses, experts or the parties. Section 20 , has to be read in the context of Section 2 2 , which places a threshold limitation on the applicability of Part I, where the place of arbitration is in India.
Therefore, Section 20 would also not support the submission of the extra-territorial applicability of Part I, as canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellants, so far as purely domestic arbitration is concerned. True, that in an international commercial arbitration, having a seat in India, hearings may be necessitated outside India. In such circumstances, the hearing of the arbitration will be conducted at the venue fixed by the parties, but it would not have the effect of changing the seat of arbitration which would remain in India.
In Naviera siteica Peruana S. The Court of Appeal summarized the State of the jurisprudence on this topic. Thereafter, the conclusions which arose from the material were summarized as follows: It is observed that the problem about all these formulations, including the third, is that they elide the distinction between the legal localization of an arbitration on the one hand and the appropriate or convenient geographical locality for hearings of the arbitration on the other hand.
This is usually referred to as the curial or procedural law, or the lex fori. Whitworth Street Estates Manchester Ltd. PapierIrke Waldhof- Aschaf-fenburg A. But it points out that in reality parties would hardly make such a decision as it would create enormous unnecessary complexities.
On examination of the facts in that case, the Court of Appeal observed that there is nothing surprising in concluding that these parties intended that any dispute under this policy, should be arbitrated in London.
But it would always be open to the Arbitral Tribunal to hold hearings in Lima if this were thought to be convenient, even though the seat or forum of the arbitration would remain in London. In this case the Court considered two applications relating to the First Award of an arbitrator. This award dealt with enforceability of the clauses of the EPC Contract which provided for liquidated damages for delay.
The claimant applied for leave to appeal against this award upon a question of law whilst the Defendant sought, in effect, a declaration that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain such an application and for leave to enforce the award. The Contractor argued that the seat of the arbitration was Scotland whilst the Employer argued that it was England.
There were to be two contractors involved with the project. The Contract shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England and Wales and, subject to Clause Any such reference to arbitration shall be deemed to be a reference to arbitration within the meaning of the Arbitration Act , or any statutory re-enactment. Rule 1. Upon consideration of the entire material, the Court formed the view that it does have jurisdiction to entertain an application by either party to the contract in question under Section 69 of the English Arbitration Act, The court gave the following reasons for the decision: It is a jurisdiction over disputes and not simply a court in which a foreign award may be enforced.
If it is in arbitration alone that disputes are to be settled and the English Courts have no residual involvement in that process, this part of Clause 1. The Arbitration Act , permits and requires the Court to entertain applications under Section 69 for leave to appeal against awards which address disputes which have been referred to arbitration. By allowing such applications and then addressing the relevant questions of law, the Court will settle such disputes; even if the application is refused, the court will be applying its jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act , and providing resolution in relation to such disputes.
The parties presumably meant something in using the expression and the most obvious meaning is that the parties were agreeing that the Arbitration Act , should apply to the reference without qualification. Their constant references to the Arbitration Act , suggest that the parties at least envisaged the possibility that the Courts of England and Wales might play some part in policing any arbitration.
For instance, Rule That would have to be the English Court, in practice. Glasgow being only the venue for holding the hearings of the arbitration proceedings. It was further concluded that where in substance the parties agreed that the laws of one country will govern and control a given arbitration, the place where the arbitration is to be heard will not dictate what the governing law or controlling law will be. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the reliance placed upon this judgment by Mr.
Sundaram is wholly misplaced. The claimants made an application to the High Court in New Delhi seeking interim measures of protection under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, , prior to the institution of arbitration proceedings.
Following the commencement of the arbitration, the defendant and the joint venture company raised a challenge to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, which the panel heard as a preliminary issue. The tribunal rejected the jurisdictional objection. The English Court gave leave to the claimant to enforce the costs award as a judgment. The defendant applied to the High Court of Delhi under Section 34 2 iv of the Arbitration Act, to set aside the costs award. The defendant applied to the Delhi High Court for an order directing the claimants not to take any action to execute the charging order, pending the final disposal of the Section 34 petition in Delhi seeking to set aside the costs award.
The defendant had sought unsuccessfully to challenge the costs award in the Commercial Court under Section 68 and Section 69 of the Act U. Examining the fact situation in the case, the Court observed as follows: Here the Court of Appeal in England was examining an appeal by the defendant insurer from the judgment of Cooke, J. A partial award was made in favour of the claimants. It was agreed that this partial award is, in English Law terms, final as to what it decides.
It was in consequence of such intimation that the claimant sought and obtained an interim anti-suit injunction. The Judge held that parties had agreed that any proceedings seeking to attack or set aside the partial award would only be those permitted by English Law.
It was not, therefore, permissible for the defendant to bring any proceedings in New York or elsewhere to attack the partial award. The Judge rejected the arguments to the effect that the choice of the law of New York as the proper law of the contract amounted to an agreement that the law of England should not apply to proceedings post award. The Judge also rejected a further argument that the separate agreement to arbitrate contained in the Condition V o of the policy was itself governed by New York Law so that proceedings could be instituted in New York.
The Judge granted the claimant a final injunction. The Court of Appeal noticed the submission on behalf of the defendant as follows: On the facts of the case, the Court held that the seat of the arbitration was in England and accordingly entertained the challenge to the award. Again in Union of India Vs. In this case, the agreement provided that: Construing the aforesaid clause, the Court held as follows: Enesa Engenharia SA — Enesa.
This immediately establishes a strong connection between the arbitration agreement itself and the law of England. It is for this reason that recent authorities have laid stress upon the locations of the seat of the arbitration as an important factor in determining the proper law of the arbitration agreement.
D by the High Court as well as the Court of Appeal. In Paragraph 12, the observations made have particular relevance which are as under:. Para It was thereafter concluded by the High Court that English Law is the proper law of the agreement to arbitrate. The legal position that emerges from a conspectus of all the decisions, seems to be, that the choice of another country as the seat of arbitration inevitably imports an acceptance that the law of that country relating to the conduct and supervision of arbitrations will apply to the proceedings.
It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that Section 28 is another indication of the intention of the Parliament that Part I of the Arbitration Act, was not confined to arbitrations which take place in India. We are unable to accept the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties.
In other words, it deals with the applicable conflict of law rules. This section makes a distinction between purely domestic arbitrations and international commercial arbitrations, with a seat in India. This is clearly to ensure that two or more Indian parties do not circumvent the substantive Indian law, by resorting to arbitrations. The provision would have an overriding effect over any other contrary provision in such contract.
The section merely shows that the legislature has segregated the domestic and international arbitration. Therefore, to suit India, conflict of law rules have been suitably modified, where the arbitration is in India. This will not apply where the seat is outside India.
In that event, the conflict of laws rules of the country in which the arbitration takes place would have to be applied. It was next submitted by the counsel for the appellants that even some of the provisions contained in Part II would indicate that Part I of the Arbitration Act, would not be limited to the arbitrations which take place in India.
It was pointed out that even though Part II deals specifically with recognition and enforcement of certain foreign awards yet provision is made for annulment of the award by two Courts, i. This, according to the learned counsel, recognizes the concurrent jurisdictions of Courts in two countries to set aside the award.
This is in reply to the submission made by Mr. At this stage, Mr. Sorabjee had relied on Reliance Industries Ltd. We must notice here that Mr. Sundaram in his submissions has not gone so far as Mr. According to Mr. Sundaram, the jurisdiction of a domestic Court over an arbitration is neither conferred by the New York Convention, nor under Part II, since Part II merely deals with circumstances under which the enforcing court may or may not refuse to enforce the award.
That circumstance includes annulment of proceedings in a competent court, i.
Sundaram, providing two such situs for the purposes of annulment does not ipso facto amount to conferring of jurisdiction to annul, on any domestic Court. The provision only provides that if the annulment proceedings are before such Courts, the award may not be enforced. Therefore, to see if an arbitral award can be annulled by the Court of the country, one has to look at the jurisdiction of such Courts under the domestic law.
The relevance of New York Convention and Article V 1 e ends there, with merely recognizing possibility of two Courts having jurisdiction to annul an award. Subramanium emphasised that provisions contained in Part II can not be said to be a complete code as it necessarily makes use of the provisions of Part I. Since Part I prescribes the entire procedure for the conduct of an arbitration and Part II is only to give recognition to certain foreign awards, the two parts have to be read harmoniously in order to make the Indian Arbitration Law a complete code.
The aforesaid provision contains a non- obstante clause. This clearly indicates that it is contemplated by the legislature that provisions of Part I would apply to matters covered by Part II. He, therefore, points out that if Part I were to apply only to arbitrations that take place in India, then Indian Courts would not be able to grant any interim relief under Section 9 to arbitrations which take place outside India.
He also points out that there are a number of other provisions where Indian Courts would render assistance in arbitrations taking place outside India. Learned senior counsel has also pointed out the necessity to read Sections 34 and 48 of the Arbitration Act, harmoniously.
He points out that barring Section 34 , which involves the challenge to an award, the other provisions in Part I and Part II are facilitative in character.
We are unable to agree with the submission of the learned senior counsel that there is any overlapping of the provisions in Part I and Part II; nor are the provisions in Part II supplementary to Part I. Rather there is complete segregation between the two parts.
Generally speaking, regulation of arbitration consists of four steps a the commencement of arbitration; b the conduct of arbitration; c the challenge to the award; and d the recognition or enforcement of the award. Part I of the Arbitration Act, regulates arbitrations at all the four stages.
Part II, however, regulates arbitration only in respect of commencement and recognition or enforcement of the award. In Part I, Section 8 regulates the commencement of arbitration in India, Sections 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 10 to 26 , 28 to 33 regulate the conduct of arbitration, Section 34 regulates the challenge to the award, Sections 35 and 36 regulate the recognition and enforcement of the award. Sections 1 , 2 , 7 , 9 , 27 , 37 , 38 to 43 are ancillary provisions that either support the arbitral process or are structurally necessary.
Thus, it can be seen that Part I deals with all stages of the arbitrations which take place in India. In Part II, on the other hand, there are no provisions regulating the conduct of arbitration nor the challenge to the award. Section 45 only empowers the judicial authority to refer the parties to arbitration outside India in pending civil action. Sections 46 to 49 regulate the recognition and enforcement of the award.
Sections 44 , 50 to 52 are structurally necessary. Thus, it is clear that the regulation of conduct of arbitration and challenge to an award would have to be done by the courts of the country in which the arbitration is being conducted. Such a court is then the supervisory court possessed of the power to annul the award. It also recognizes the territorial principle which gives effect to the sovereign right of a country to regulate, through its national courts, an adjudicatory duty being performed in its own country.
By way of a comparative example, we may reiterate the observations made by the Court of Appeal, England in C Vs. B, wherein it is observed that: Having accepted the principle of territoriality, it is evident that the intention of the parliament was to segregate Part I and Part II.
Therefore, any of the provisions contained in Part I can not be made applicable to Foreign Awards, as defined under Sections 44 and 53 , i. This would be a distortion of the scheme of the Act.
It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission of Mr. Subramanium that provisions contained in Part II are supplementary to the provision contained in Part I. The Parliament has clearly segregated the two parts. Section 45 falls within Part II which deals with enforcement proceedings in India and does not deal with the challenge to the validity of the arbitral awards rendered outside India. Section 45 empowers a judicial authority to refer the parties to arbitration, on the request made by a party, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement referred to in Section In our opinion, there is no justification for such confusion.
This is clearly in recognition of the phenomenon that the judicial control of commercial disputes is no longer in the exclusive jurisdiction of Courts. There are many statutory bodies, tribunals which would have adjudicatory jurisdiction in very complex commercial matters. Section 5 would be equally applicable to such bodies. The learned senior counsel had also pointed out that since Section 19 of the Arbitration Act, clearly provides that the arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, , there was no need for the non-obstante clause.
But the reason, in our view, is discernable from Section 3 of the Act, which also contains a non-obstante clause with reference to the Arbitration Act , Section 45 in the Arbitration Act , is a repetition of the non-obstante clause in Section 3 in the Act. It is not unusual for a consolidating act to retain the expressions used in the previous Acts, which have been consolidated into a form of Principal Act.
Therefore, in section 45 of the Arbitration Act, , the reference to Act has been replaced by reference to Part I, which now covers the purely domestic arbitrations, earlier covered by the and the new additions, i. A three judge bench of this Court in R. Raghnath Vs. We are, therefore, of the opinion that existence of the non-obstante clause does not alter the scope and ambit of the field of applicability of Part I to include international commercial arbitrations, which take place out of India.
We may further point out that a similar provision existed in the English Arbitration Act, and the English Arbitration Act, In view of the above, it would not be possible to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the aforesaid non-obstante clause in Section 45 would indicate that provisions of Part I would also be applicable to arbitrations that take place outside India.
It would be apposite to notice the provisions of Section 48 at this stage, which are as under: Thus, the intention of the legislature is clear that the Court may refuse to enforce the foreign award on satisfactory proof of any of the grounds mentioned in Section 48 1 , by the party resisting the enforcement of the award.
The provision sets out the defences open to the party to resist enforcement of a foreign award. The provision merely recognizes that courts of the two nations which are competent to annul or suspend an award.
It does not ipso facto confer jurisdiction on such Courts for annulment of an award made outside the country. Such jurisdiction has to be specifically provided, in the relevant national legislation of the country in which the Court concerned is located. So far as India is concerned, the Arbitration Act , does not confer any such jurisdiction on the Indian Courts to annul an international commercial award made outside India. Such provision exists in Section 34 , which is placed in Part I. Therefore, the applicability of that provision is limited to the awards made in India.
If the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants are accepted, it would entail incorporating the provision contained in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, , which is placed in Part I of the Arbitration Act, into Part II of the said Act. This is not permissible as the intention of the Parliament was clearly to confine the powers of the Indian Courts to set aside an award relating to international commercial arbitrations, which take place in India.
It is clarified that Section 48 1 e is only one of the defences on the basis of which recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused. It has no relevance to the determination of the issue as to whether the national law of a country confers upon its courts, the jurisdiction to annul the awards made outside the country. The provision only means that Indian Courts would recognize as a valid defence in the enforcement proceedings relating to a foreign award, if the Court is satisfied that the award has been set aside in one of the two countries, i.
In our opinion, interpreting the provision in the manner suggested by Mr. Sundaram would lead to very serious practical problems. The author points out the reasons for incorporating the second forum for annulment. The legislative history of the Convention sheds illuminating light on the issue.
The text of Article V 1 e originally proposed acknowledge only the bringing of an annulment action in the place in which the award was made. One of the delegates at the Conference devoted to the drafting of the Convention raised the question of what would happen if the forum at the place of arbitration would refuse to entertain an annulment action.
The obviously correct answer to that question would have been that, in that case, no annulment action could be brought and that the happy consequence would be that only denial of recognition and enforcement on grounds specified in the Convention would be possible.
Instead, the drafters of the Convention provided for an alternative forum in the country the arbitration laws of which governed the arbitration. That choice was both most fateful and most regrettable. These observations militate against the concurrent jurisdiction submission of Mr.
Accepting the submission made by Mr. Sundaram, would lead to unnecessary confusion. There can be only one Court with jurisdiction to set aside the award. There is a public policy consideration apparent, favouring the interpretation that, only one Court would have jurisdiction to set aside the arbitral award. D supra. The observation of the Court of Appeal in Paragraph 16 of the judgment has already been reproduced earlier in this judgment. It was pointed out by the Court of Appeal that accepting more than one jurisdiction for judicial remedies in respect of an award would be a recipe for litigation and confusion.
The creation of such a situation is apparent from the judgment of this Court in Venture Global Engineering supra. In the aforesaid judgment, the award was made by the London Court of International Arbitration on 3rd April, Respondent No.
The appellant entered appearance to defend this proceeding before the US Court by filing a cross petition. In the said petition, it took objection to the enforcement of the award, which had directed transfer of shares.
Two weeks later on 28th April, , the appellant filed a suit in the City Civil Court, Secunderabad seeking declaration to set aside the award and permanent injunction on the transfer of shares. On 15th June, , the District Court passed an ad interim ex parte order of injunction, inter alia, restraining respondent No.
On 13th July, , in response to the summons, respondent No. The trial court by its order dated 28th December, , allowed the said application and rejected the plaint of the appellant.
On 27th February, , the High Court dismissed the appeal holding that the award cannot be challenged even if it is against public policy and in contravention of statutory provisions. The judgment of the High Court was challenged in appeal before this Court. The appeal was allowed. With these observations, the matter was remanded back to the trial court to dispose of the suit on merits. The submissions made by Mr. Venugopal, as noticed in paragraph 42, epitomize the kind of chaos which would be created by two court systems, in two different countries, exercising concurrent jurisdiction over the same dispute.
There would be a clear risk of conflicting decisions. This would add to the problems relating to the enforcement of such decisions. Gary B. He further notices that courts have generally been extremely reluctant to conclude that the parties have agreed upon a procedural law other than that of the arbitral seat.
The underlying motivation of the New York Convention was to reduce the hurdles and produce a uniform, simple and speedy system for enforcement of foreign arbitral award. The aforesaid expression came up for consideration in the case of Karaha Bodas Co. LLC Vs. Similarly, in the case of Karaha Bodas Co. This was a case where the substantive law applicable to the contract was Indonesian law and the country of the arbitration i.
This was rejected. It was held that Article V 1 e referred to the procedural or curial law and that because the seat of the arbitration was in Switzerland, the lex arbitri or the curial or procedural law applicable to the arbitration was Swiss law. Therefore, only the Swiss Courts had jurisdiction to set aside the award. In International Electric Corporation Vs. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petroleva, Industrial Y Commercial, the New York Court held that the italicised words referred to the procedural law governing the arbitration, and not to the substantive law governing the agreement between the parties, since the situs of arbitration is Mexico, the governing procedural law that of Mexico, only Mexico Courts have jurisdiction under the Convention to vacate the award.
Redfern and Hunter supra at paragraph They point out that the prospect of an award being set aside under the procedural law of a State other than that at the seat of arbitration is unlikely. They point out that an ingenious but unsuccessful attempt was made to persuade the US District Court to set aside an award made in Mexico, on the basis that the reference to the law under which that award was made was a reference to the law governing the dispute and not to the procedural law Paragraph US Vs.
Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera Argentina. The Court went on to hold that since the quorum of arbitration was Mexico, only the Mexican court had jurisdiction to set aside the award. The correct position under the New York Convention is described very clearly and concisely by Gary B.
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We are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Sundaram that the provision confers concurrent jurisdiction in both the fora.