Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy | 𝗥𝗲𝗾𝘂𝗲𝘀𝘁 𝗣𝗗𝗙 on ResearchGate | On Jan 1, , Mark M. Lowenthal and others published Intelligence: From Secrets to. Trove: Find and get Australian resources. Books, images, historic newspapers, maps, archives and more. Mark M. Lowenthal's trusted guide is the go-to resource for understanding how the intelligence community's history, structure, procedures, and functions affect policy decisions. Mark Lowenthal's trusted guide has become the 'go-to' resource for understanding how the intelligence.
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"Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy remains the best available introduction to the U.S. intelligence community and what it does. Clearly written, comprehensive. "Mark Lowenthal's Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy is a marvelous guide to the discipline's concepts and theories, and it keeps getting better with each edition. Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis, by Patrick F. Walsh. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Fifth Edition), by Mark M. Lowenthal. Historical. Castles Made of.
It defines, succinctly and practically, an intelligence process that places analysis in the central role for communicating the discoveries of intelligence into the policy narrative. At the operational level, products like the Dynamic Threat Assessments and Military Capabilities Studies inform the military leadership about the complexities of the environment within which they could be required to employ armed force. The process described by Lowenthal is widely accepted as a starting point for scholarly discussions on the intelligence business.
In fact, many undergraduate and graduate-level programs in intelligence have long prescribed his book as a foundational text. Practitioners of intelligence consider his work as largely consistent with both the philosophy and functional mechanisms that characterize the day-to-day employment of U.
DUDLEY intelligence, at both the strategic and operational levels where military forces gain insights into adversaries prior to the initiation of military operations. Decisionmakers consume a steady diet of analysis and provide guidance on the direction in which knowledge should be further developed. In utilizing this model, that most intelligence personnel are assigned to produce analysis is perhaps unsurprising.
Figure 1 depicts an analysis-centric intelligence process, with analysis serving as the keystone. Guidance for intelligence services is provided when policymakers define issues of interest to national security within which Analysis Collection Collection Policy Collection Reporting Knowledge Mgt.
Report Evaluation Figure 1. The analysis-centric model. Pursuant to intelligence priorities, professional analysts build institutional expertise by researching available information and assessing what is known about an issue, often creating a baseline report or series of assessments to inform decisionmakers. While knowledge development is important, the goal is the development of foreknowledge that enables decisionmakers to anticipate events and acquire a competitive advantage.
Analysts are trained and professionally developed in mining data, building complex arguments, overcoming inherent, often subconscious biases, and assigning levels-of- confidence to their assessments. Analysts are also trained to articulate what information is needed in the information environment to progress from knowledge to foreknowledge.
Worth emphasizing is who analysts are in practical terms. When analysts leave their account and proceed to another topic area, or leave the organization, structural processes allow for continuity and the transition of expertise to one or more analysts within the organization. When analysts gain a clear understanding of what is unknown about their intelligence problem, they incorporate it into the function of collection management. Professional staff members in collection requirements examine the breadth of available resources, ranging from human intelligence to signals intelligence, open source intelligence, partner nations, and others.
They also assess how the collected information will be processed and disseminated to their analysts, to determine the most effective strategy for acquiring new information needed to advance analysis. Collection personnel, notably far fewer than those dedicated to analysis, actively collect and report information to the analytic entity in response to the requirements levied upon them. DUDLEY transmission to the all-source analysts in a way that enables seamless integration to their role in knowledge development.
Each report resulting from multi-INT collection requires evaluation by an analyst to inform the collector if the information was timely and relevant to advancing the analytic storyline. This method of utilizing analysis to ascribe value to the employment of collection activities stands in stark contrast to the information-centric model.
Although portraying the basic characterization of the analysis-centric model at a level of detail that may seem overly simplistic, emphasizing the markedly different framework in which much of the world conceptualizes and employs intelligence is necessary.
This distinctive phenomenon has reverberating effects on defining where abstract value resides, how resources are employed, and the expectations regarding how intelligence will support decisionmaking. The information-centric model is similar to the analysis-centric model in prescribing policy topics worthy of investing intelligence resources.
For example, the leader of a domestic intelligence service responsible for characterizing an insurgency within state borders will directly employ intelligence officers collectors to report information that will ultimately be communicated to the appropriate decisionmakers within government. The information-centric model. Collectors—the majority of intelligence personnel—ultimately produce reports based on the information provided by their sources.
These reports are administratively processed up the echelons of the organization. The relative worth of each compiled piece of information is determined at each level according to its immediate relevance or utility, not by its ability to advance knowledge as in the analysis-centric model. Collectors quickly develop an understanding of the types of information, and accompanying narrative, that will most effectively resonate with their leadership.
Knowledge development, insofar as it exists, resides within the individuals producing or processing the reports and not as a distinct institutional mechanism.
Characterizing Security Issues The absence of an institutional mechanism for knowledge development in the information-centric model does not mean that the intelligence institutions do not have individuals who can speak knowingly about aspects of a security issue, but rather that knowledge, insofar as it exists in the organization, resides in individuals, often leaders, who have access to information as it rises through the echelons.
Each individual receiving the information will inherently develop some knowledge of the security issue, but this individual- based knowledge differs markedly from an institutional knowledge developed and maintained in a distinctively unique analytic component. Most notably, the analytic cadres employed in the analysis-centric model are trained to overcome cognitive, intellectual, and political obstacles that tend to plague objective judgment; in the information-centric model those shortfalls are prevalent and systemic.
Without an institutional mechanism for analysis, states are unable to effectively utilize intelligence services to generate knowledge on national security issues. Instead, they simply have an abundance of information. In fact, finding the fax machine of an intelligence chief busily producing information reports generated at lower echelons is not uncommon.
In such instances, the functional component that would create and present knowledge for a decisionmaker—ideally toward advance knowledge—does not exist in any meaningful capacity.
Without this analytic capability, states are unable to sufficiently utilize the detailed characterization of national security issues to develop policy solutions that comprehensively address the issue.
Intelligence institutions tend to chase endless information because they usually lack sufficient knowledge to allow them to focus their resources on obtaining data that can become progressively insightful.
Unfortunately, the absence of analytic capability also means the absence of an objective entity to audit the veracity of the information being used by a leader. Perhaps unsurprising then is that numerous sources of information are, in fact, ghost sources: they do not exist, but are instead created by ground-level collectors who recognize certain types of information that most directly correlate to their professional success and the resources they are given to run sources.
Collectors are thus incentivized to fabricate sources and, at a minimum, exaggerate the information provided by them. MI5 performs a unique service to support these two lines of operation.
MI5 serves as an assessment agency as well as a collection entity. MI5 has been criticized for not providing warning of the Bali attacks in October , the Mombasa attack in November , and failing to pass specific intelligence regarding the shoe bomber, Richard Reid. An examination of the U. The ISC reports directly to the prime minister and is charged with producing an annual report on intelligence activities. Additionally, despite the oversight mechanisms, MI5 continues to remain essentially a self-tasking organization requiring no separate approval before initiating a new operation.
The organization also has a long history of performing its internal security and domestic intelligence functions. The United Kingdom also possesses several highly-evolved mechanisms to coordinate the sharing of intelligence. Despite this structure, there have been several instances where MI5 did not share its intelligence. Effective intelligence sharing remains an issue.
Its domestic intelligence agency also operates under a well-defined set of national laws, although the effectiveness of information sharing remains an issue. An assessment of information-sharing practices and oversight procedures — given the numerous changes within the U. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation ASIO In the difficult fight against the new menace of international terrorism, there is nothing more crucial than timely and accurate intelligence.
Similar to MI5, it is chartered to address a wide variety of threats. Australia does not have a long history of combating terrorists. Additionally, Australia has been largely isolated by the nature of its geography. As a whole, Australia has typically viewed its strategic threats in a foreign context and has prized international cooperation with its allies to deal with its security issues. Despite its lack of internal threats, the Australian government has taken a serious and very thorough approach to internal security.
It went through significant security preparations for the Sydney Olympic Games, which also highlighted the value of international cooperation. Improving intelligence capacity, increasing the effectiveness of information sharing, seeking better detection capabilities, and improving law enforcement coordination are the overarching themes under prevention and preparedness.
On November 18, , Australian authorities foiled the activities of two terrorist cells. ASIO and Australian law enforcement agencies were able to prevent an attack possibly aimed at critical infrastructure as a result of an eighteen-month long investigation into individuals with possible linkages to al Qaeda and radical Kashmiri groups.
Despite Australian and British similarities and the ability of their domestic intelligence agencies to possibly develop greater precision in categorizing the domestic threat, their information sharing problems remain a relevant issue for the United States.
Although Australia is similar to the United Kingdom, there is a greater distinction between executive and legislative oversight roles. This unique arrangement allows the IGIS to assist the government and parliament in oversight matters, but allows the office to act independently. The IGIS also enjoys total access to all intelligence and possesses the power of independent inquiry.
Although not a method of oversight, the Australian government also has an aggressive public outreach program. ASIO also has a long history in internal security and domestic intelligence. An examination of Australian oversight mechanisms and public outreach programs may offer some areas for improvement in the United States.
Similar to the United Kingdom, it also has faced some information sharing shortfalls and although it possesses a better-defined executive and legislative oversight process, there have been instances of past abuse.
We will cooperate with everybody, bilaterally, regionally, at the global level, in the fight against terror. India has been hard-pressed to reform its intelligence apparatus. This study, headed by former RAW director Girish Saxena, submitted numerous recommendations to streamline the intelligence process.
The Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Finance have disapproved the key elements recommended by the committee.
Funding for the JTFIs and associated training has also been cut. This bureaucratic confrontation is attributable to the long-standing infighting between the Indian Administrative Service officers who dominate the Home ministry and the Indian Police Service officers who constitute the majority of the IB. Strategic Outlook. India has faced many internal security problems since establishing its independence in Consisting of a multitude of ethnicities, languages, and particularly due to the partition of India and Pakistan, India has faced numerous acts of sectarian violence.
In , the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight prompted calls for stronger anti-terrorism legislation. Although the Indian government has recognized the threat posed by al Qaeda through its proximity to the Indian subcontinent, the government has been unable to articulate precisely its approach to combating terrorism.
A key shortfall in the POTA legislation was that it lacked any linkage to a wider counterterrorism strategy and approach. If these means are sufficient, then the goals of the law can be reached. Raman asserts, this is due to three factors: The absence of long-term thinking and planning are due to preoccupation with day-to-day crisis management and short-term compulsions, the inhibition of fresh thinking and a coordinated approach to national security issues due to the undue influence of narrow departmental mindsets, and the absence of a watchdog set-up, uninfluenced by departmental loyalties, to monitor the implementation of the national security decisions and remove bottlenecks.
The IB clearly has many domestic intelligence functions. Conversely, unclear strategic guidance, obscured responsibilities, bureaucratic infighting, and extremely limited oversight mechanisms severely hamper its ability to execute its mission. Information Sharing. The challenges faced by the IB are also a reflection of the Indian national security apparatus. Additionally, abuse of the Official Secrets Act of prohibits national security issues from coming into the forefront of public debate.
The usefulness and the quality of intelligence is only as good as the government of the day requires. Understanding the linkage between implementing reform and oversight, given the challenge faced by the Indian government, is of unique importance for the United States. The IB has not been given the necessary tools and resources to fulfill its mission.
Although the IB has a long history of performing its internal security function, the majority of its focus has been on political surveillance. Despite sound recommendations and higher-level organizational initiatives, bureaucratic infighting and petty competition have inhibited translating these initiatives into meaningful activities. Lastly, despite possessing definitive intelligence organizations and mandated assessment entities, the lack of strong executive direction and bipartisanship, weak legislative oversight, organizational instability, and ineffective resourcing have resulted in a listless national security and intelligence apparatus.
These limitations, when compared to the DCAF benchmarks in Figure 3, display a marginal effectiveness.
Its independent assessment capability has not been properly resourced and bureaucratic infighting greatly inhibits the ability of the executive to coordinate and direct intelligence efforts. Proponents of a domestic intelligence agency highlight the importance of prevention, yet domestic intelligence agencies focused solely on information gathering and developing sources have not been proven to be more effective in preventing terrorist attacks.
They may have a greater ability to develop better and more precise intelligence assessments on the nature of the domestic threat. The bombings in London and Mumbai , however, highlight the point that not all attacks can be prevented. Additionally, the metrics for how many attacks have been prevented and where these agencies can cite unreported successes is absent due to their classified nature. By examining the United Kingdom, Australia, and India, it is evident that the challenges of coordinating intelligence, sharing information, and implementing oversight mechanisms are problematic and relevant issues for their domestic intelligence agencies.
Although the United States does not have an assessment apparatus as highly centralized and evolved as the United Kingdom or Australia, it has been recognized as a shortfall and steps have been taken to address this issue. The major change was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security with an intelligence charter. As a result of further findings, the FBI consolidated many of its intelligence functions under the creation of the National Security Service.
Despite the plethora of executive findings and directives, there are still significant bureaucratic hurdles and infighting to sharing information. Intelligence oversight remains an issue for the United States. While oversight issues are also challenges for MI5, ASIO, and the IB, Australia seems to have a highly developed, resourced, and aggressive executive and legislative oversight component. Figure 4.
When compared to the DCAF benchmarks in Figure 4, the United States possesses a well-defined set of laws operating under a strong executive mechanism.
These strengths are offset, however, by a weaker executive and legislative oversight process. Although U. As seen in the Indian case, limited oversight can also lead to poor implementation of intelligence initiatives. SUMMARY Although domestic intelligence agencies possess several shortfalls in not being able to prevent terrorist attacks and have corresponding information-sharing shortfalls and oversight issues, these shortfalls do not address the entire scope of the problem.
While domestic intelligence agencies may not be able to prevent all terrorist attacks, are they more successful in preventing most attacks? Do effective domestic intelligence agencies, solely focused on intelligence gathering and unencumbered by law enforcement responsibilities, possess a better ability to focus and develop precise intelligence? Without access to classified sources or performance measures, most literature would suggest that domestic intelligence agencies are more effective in developing intelligence through the penetration of terrorist cells and collation of other intelligence data.
Balancing civil rights and public safety remains a problematic issue for democracies whether they possess a domestic intelligence agency or not.
Despite the arguments posed by the advocates for and opponents of having a domestic intelligence agency for the United States, an examination of MI5, ASIO, and the IB have shown that domestic intelligence agencies are not necessarily the solution to the domestic intelligence gap.
They may possess a greater ability to better categorize threats and operate unencumbered by complicated and competing mission roles within one agency. In terms of the feasibility, suitability, and acceptability of implementing this organizational construct for the United States, it is feasible to develop a U.
The critical feasibility issue, however, is whether the United States can translate strategic guidance and direction into meaningful change, reform, and capability that mitigate the domestic intelligence gap — whether under a domestic intelligence agency or some other organizational construct.
Suitability whether the mission will be accomplished if the tasks are carried out successfully is also contingent on the ability to translate strategic intent into meaningful change. Additionally, the obstacles to creating a unified DHS are another indication of bureaucratic intransigence. The implementation of a strategic vision into reality is clearly a challenge that India has had to face.
These shortfalls and others would indicate that current tasks and reforms are not being effectively implemented. In the absence of definitively demonstrating that domestic intelligence agencies are better positioned to prevent most attacks, the single largest obstacle to implementing this organizational construct in the United States is cultural.
Given the history and structure of the United States, it is probably still not acceptable to have a domestic intelligence agency. The central issue is not whether to have a combined law enforcement and intelligence organization versus a sole domestic intelligence agency. The issue is effective organizational reform, information sharing, and oversight.
The creation of additional bureaucracies, an increased centralization of intelligence functions that inhibits the analysis of opposing alternatives, and the inability of the U. Congress to reform its oversight process may have actually led to greater drawbacks rather than progress.
This uncertainty continues to place the United States at risk.