Per la pace perpetua kant pdf connect to download. Get pdf. Ref lect ions on t he Realist Crit ique of Kant 's Proj ect, Journal of Human Right s, 5: 3, To link to this In I. Kant, Per la pace perpetua (Milano: Feltrinelli), pp. Bobbio Introduzione a Kant Per La Pace Perpetua by carlofollenti. Download as PDF or read online from Scribd. Flag for inappropriate content. Download. Per La Pace Perpetua - [FREE] [PDF] [EPUB] Per La Pace Perpetua [Ebooks] Per la pace perpetua progetto filosofico di EMANUELE KANT.

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Per La Pace Perpetua Kant Pdf

per la pace perpetua la via della pace di immanuel fmea manual 4th edition standard grade chemistry credit scottish certificate of education past examination . Per la pace perpetua by Immanuel Kant is Philosophy Scritto nel , questo progetto etico-giuridico recepisce tutte le sollecitazioni di uno. (), compilata da L.A ma, 04 mrt GMT Per La Pace Perpetua La Via Della Pace Di Immanuel Kant Per la pace perpetua Un progetto .

Organizzazione[ modifica modifica wikitesto ] Essa fa riferimento a un modello di organizzazione politica in cui gli individui, a prescindere dalla loro provenienza geografica, possono godere di alcuni strumenti per prendere parte alla gestione degli affari pubblici globali, in aggiunta alla e per alcuni versi indipendentemente dalla politica locale. Il progetto pacifista di Kant Per l'autore di La pace perpetua, lo stato di guerra non transita naturalmente in uno stato di pace, ma transita in uno stato di assenza di guerra. I popoli questi stati federati, durante il processo politico, si trasformano nel popolo dello Stato federale. An Agenda for a New World Order , hanno rilanciato questa nozione e dato vita al dibattito contemporaneo circa il cosmopolitismo. Essa presenta alcune assonanze con le moderne teorie della pace. In particolare, la democrazia cosmopolitica potrebbe essere intesa come un tentativo di raffinare e applicare all'attuale panorama politico alcune delle intuizioni del pacifismo istituzionale.

This ingenious invention of a commercial people [England] in this century is dangerous because it is a war treasure which exceeds the treasures of all other states; it cannot be exhausted except by default of taxes which is inevitable , though it can be long delayed by the stimulus to trade which occurs through the reaction of credit on industry and commerce. This facility in making war, together with the inclination to do so on the part of rulers--an inclination which seems inborn in human nature--is thus a great hindrance to perpetual peace.

Therefore, to forbid this credit system must be a preliminary article of perpetual peace all the more because it must eventually entangle many innocent states in the inevitable bankruptcy and openly harm them. They are therefore justified in allying themselves against such a state and its measures.

The offense, perhaps, which a state gives to the subjects of another state? Rather the example of the evil into which a state has fallen because of its lawlessness should serve as a warning. Moreover, the bad example which one free person affords another as a scandalum acceptum is not an infringement of his rights. But it would be quite different if a state, by internal rebellion, should fall into two parts, each of which pretended to be a separate state making claim to the whole.

To lend assistance to one of these cannot be considered an interference in the constitution of the other state for it is then in a state of anarchy. But so long as the internal dissension has not come to this critical point, such interference by foreign powers would infringe on the rights of an independent people struggling with its internal disease; hence it would itself be an offense and would render the autonomy of all states insecure.

For some confidence in the character of the enemy must remain even in the midst of war, as otherwise no peace could be concluded and the hostilities would degenerate into a war of extermination bellum internecinum. War, however, is only the sad recourse in the state of nature where there is no tribunal which could judge with the force of law by which each state asserts its right by violence and in which neither party can be adjudged unjust for that would presuppose a juridical decision ; in lieu of such a decision, the issue of the conflict as if given by a so-called "judgment of God" decides on which side justice lies.

But between states no punitive war bellum punitivum is conceivable, because there is no relation between them of master and servant. It follows that a war of extermination, in which the destruction of both parties and of all justice can result, would permit perpetual peace only in the vast burial ground of the human race.


Therefore, such a war and the use of all means leading to it must be absolutely forbidden. But that the means cited do inevitably lead to it is clear from the fact that these infernal arts, vile in themselves, when once used would not long be confined to the sphere of war.

Take, for instance, the use of spies uti exploratoribus. In this, one employs the infamy of others which can never be entirely eradicated only to encourage its persistence even into the state of peace, to the undoing of the very spirit of peace. Although the laws stated are objectively, i.

Such are Nos. Others, like Nos. This permission does not authorize, under No. For the prohibition concerns only the manner of acquisition which is no longer permitted, but not the possession, which, though not bearing a requisite title of right, has nevertheless been held lawful in all states by the public opinion of the time the time of the putative acquisition.

This does not always mean open hostilities, but at least an unceasing threat of war. A state of peace, therefore, must be established, for in order to be secured against hostility it is not sufficient that hostilities simply be not committed; and, unless this security is pledged to each by his neighbor a thing that can occur only in a civil state , each may treat his neighbor, from whom he demands this security, as an enemy.

The republican constitution, therefore, is, with respect to law, the one which is the original basis of every form of civil constitution. The only question now is: Is it also the one which can lead to perpetual peace?

The republican constitution, besides the purity of its origin having sprung from the pure source of the concept of law , also gives a favorable prospect for the desired consequence, i.

The reason is this: if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared and in this constitution it cannot but be the case , nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war.

Among the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be liquidated on account of constant wars in the future. But, on the other hand, in a constitution which is not republican, and under which the subjects are not citizens, a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the world to decide upon, because war does not require of the ruler, who is the proprietor and not a member of the state, the least sacrifice of the pleasures of his table, the chase, his country houses, his court functions, and the like.

He may, therefore, resolve on war as on a pleasure party for the most trivial reasons, and with perfect indifference leave the justification which decency requires to the diplomatic corps who are ever ready to provide it. In order not to confuse the republican constitution with the democratic as is commonly done , the following should be noted. The forms of a state civitas can be divided either according to the persons who possess the sovereign power or according to the mode of administration exercised over the people by the chief, whoever he may be.

The first is properly called the form of sovereignty forma imperii , and there are only three possible forms of it: autocracy, in which one, aristocracy, in which some associated together, or democracy, in which all those who constitute society, possess sovereign power. They may be characterized, respectively, as the power of a monarch, of the nobility, or of the people.

The second division is that by the form of government forma regiminis and is based on the way in which the state makes use of its power; this way is based on the constitution, which is the act of the general will through which the many persons become one nation.

In this respect government is either republican or despotic. Republicanism is the political principle of the separation of the executive power the administration from the legislative; despotism is that of the autonomous execution by the state of laws which it has itself decreed. Thus in a despotism the public will is administered by the ruler as his own will. Of the three forms of the state, that of democracy is, properly speaking, necessarily a despotism, because it establishes an executive power in which "all" decide for or even against one who does not agree; that is, "all," who are not quite all, decide, and this is a contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom.

Every form of government which is not representative is, properly speaking, without form. The legislator can unite in one and the same person his function as legislative and as executor of his will just as little as the universal of the major premise in a syllogism can also be the subsumption of the particular under the universal in the minor. And even though the other two constitutions are always defective to the extent that they do leave room for this mode of administration, it is at least possible for them to assume a mode of government conforming to the spirit of a representative system as when Frederick II at least said he was merely the first servant of the state.

Therefore, we can say: the smaller the personnel of the government the smaller the number of rulers , the greater is their representation and the more nearly the constitution approaches to the possibility of republicanism; thus the constitution may be expected by gradual reform finally to raise itself to republicanism. For these reasons it is more difficult for an aristocracy than for a monarchy to achieve the one completely juridical constitution, and it is impossible for a democracy to do so except by violent revolution.

The mode of governments, 6 however, is incomparably more important to the people than the form of sovereignty, although much depends on the greater or lesser suitability of the latter to the end of [good] government. To conform to the concept of law, however, government must have a representative form, and in this system only a republican mode of government is possible; without it, government is despotic and arbitrary, whatever the constitution may be.

None of the ancient so-called "republics" knew this system, and they all finally and inevitably degenerated into despotism under the sovereignty of one, which is the most bearable of all forms of despotism.

Each of then, may and should for the sake of its own security demand that the others enter with it into a constitution similar to the civil constitution, for under such a constitution each can be secure in his right.

This would be a league of nations, but it would not have to be a state consisting of nations. That would be contradictory, since a state implies the relation of a superior legislating to an inferior obeying , i. This contradicts the presupposition, for here we have to weigh the rights of nations against each other so far as they are distinct states and not amalgamated into one. When we see the attachment of savages to their lawless freedom, preferring ceaseless combat to subjection to a lawful constraint which they might establish, and thus preferring senseless freedom to rational freedom, we regard it with deep contempt as barbarity, rudeness, and a brutish degradation of humanity.

Accordingly, one would think that civilized people each united in a state would hasten all the more to escape, the sooner the better, from such a depraved condition. But, instead, each state places its majesty for it is absurd to speak of the majesty of the people in being subject to no external juridical restraint, and the splendor of its sovereign consists in the fact that many thousands stand at his command to sacrifice themselves for something that does not concern them and without his needing to place himself in the least danger.

When we consider the perverseness of human nature which is nakedly revealed in the uncontrolled relations between nations this perverseness being veiled in the state of civil law by the constraint exercised by government , we may well be astonished that the word "law" has not yet been banished from war politics as pedantic, and that no state has yet been bold enough to advocate this point of view.

At the surface level the remark addresses the requirement of a match or a correspondence between the two elements involved in theoretical cognition, viz. An intuition and a concept belong to each other, complement each other and constitute a cognition in the full-fledged sense if what is sensorily given in intuition provides the material realization for what is thought in the concept, and if, vice versa, that which is being thought by the concept transforms the sensory content of an intuition into the cognition of an object.

In such a situation of match the intuition and the thought involved seem to be the intuition and the concept, respectively, of the same object, an object that is given in one case and thought in the other case.

But any such talk of presupposed objects and their alternative modes of presence to the mind as intuition and as concept, respectively suggests a realist ontology which Kant does not only not take for granted but considers very much in need of examination and revision. Kant's philosophical concern is not with the de facto match between the intuition of an object and the concept of that object but with the question how there can be such a situation of match at all, especially considering the radically different nature of intuition and concept, due to their origin in two entirely different cognitive capabilities, viz.

In advance of any particular match of some intuition and some concept with regard to some object, there is the fundamental philosophical issue of how intuitions and concepts can agree in the first place. To take it for granted that they are able to do so, as McDowell does, underestimates Kant's philosophical amazement about concepts and intuitions and the theoretical urgency of the problem that their possible relation of match or agreement possesses.

In particular, he goes on to investigate how the "pure concepts of the understanding or categories" reine Verstandesbegriffe oder Kategorien 33 can have any bearing on what is given in intuition or how the latter can undergo the former's shaping influence.

This is exactly the problem of the transcendental deduction of the categories and the associated investigations of the relation between the unity in intuitions and the unity in judgments Metaphysical Deduction 34 , of the mediation between category and pure intuition Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding and of the supreme synthetic cognitions a priori yielded by the match of categories and pure intuitions Principles of the Pure Understanding.

The entire extended argument of the Transcendental Analytic is required because in and of themselves concepts and intuitions have nothing in common, except their formal status as "representations" Vorstellungen in the mind in a generic, undifferentiated sense unsuitable for assessing their respective and collaborative epistemological functions.

It should be stressed that Kant's problem regarding intuition and concept is not limited to the relation between pure concepts and pure intuitions. It also presents itself for empirical intuitions and empirical concepts. After all, on Kant's account, the transcendental account of the categories and the pure manifold of the senses does not relate to some strange and unusual kind of cognition unrelated to ordinary knowledge but represents, in the artificial isolation of philosophical theorizing, the universal requirements of empirical cognition and its objects.

However, the philosophical problem about empirical cognition is not that of the match of empirical intuition and empirical concept. Rather the philosophical problem about empirical cognition is how to bring together the formal, non-empirical structures underlying all experience based on pure concepts and pure intuitions and objectified in universal laws of nature with materially concrete sensory data.

This problem of integrating sheer data into both the forms of intuiting and the forms of thinking still figures large in Sellars' appropriation of Kant but not in McDowell's, for whom the given does not consist of raw data to be taken up by intuitive as well as intellectual forms of cognition but of already conceptually informed intuitions.

Nor is there in McDowell's Strawsonian rather than Sellarsian Kant room for the dynamics of the universal but subjective cognitive forms enabling the formation of objectively valid cognitions.

Yet without the latter, the match of intuition and concept, whether in its generic form or as the agreement between empirical intuitions and empirical concepts or as the match of pure intuitions and pure concepts, remains a brute fact, unexplained and in principle subject to falsification. Faced with the skeptical implications of such an epistemology of conceptual facts, Kant would have stressed the merits of his own decidedly non-empirical "metaphysical" account of cognition.

The precise point of origin for Kant's opposing intuitions to concepts is the novel theory of space and time developed by Kant in the late s and first presented in published form in the Inaugural-Dissertation of , On the form and grounds of the sensible and intelligible world. In so doing, he replaces the rationalist assessment of cognition by the senses, as lacking the clarity and distinctness available to cognition by the intellect, with an alternative account that recognizes the autonomous nature of both kinds of cognition and of the two orders of things or worlds correlated with them.

For Kant the world of sense and the world of the intellect each have their own formal structures and laws, and the attempt to blur the distinction between the two epistemologies and ontologies results in the self-contradictory claims that are the antecedents of the Antinomy of Pure Reason in the Critique of pure reason. The term "intuition" intuitus first occurs in the Inaugural-Dissertation of in the negative statement that the human being does not have at its disposition an intuition of things intellectual.

On Kant's analysis, the human intellect or understanding does not grasp things intuitively, or immediately and in their singularity, but only discursively discursive , or by means of "general concepts " conceptus generales that do not address the object in its singularity but in terms of what it possibly shares with other objects.

But while the human being does not possess an intellect that intuits, it yet has another kind of intuition at its disposal, one that represents a mode of cognition different both from the discursive cognition of our intellect and the intuitive cognition of a possible non-human or rather superhuman, divine intellect.

According to Kant, this "human intuition" intuitus humanus 39 is like intellectual intuition to the extent that it grasps its object in an immediate manner, without the involvement of any other mode of cognition, and that it takes cognizance of this object in its singularity, as a unique entity that does not come into view as being like or unlike any other possible object.

Human intuition is "passive" passivus. On Kant's analysis, the nature of human, sensible intuition qua intuition, as described above immediateness, singularity , does not belong to the deliverances of the senses as such but only to the form under which they enter into the mind's cognitive apparatus.

For Kant, this form of sensible intuition is the double form of space and time, in which all sensory date are contained.

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But space and time are not only the forms of sensibility. First and foremost they are themselves intuitions. To be sure, as forms for all "later" filling by sensory material, space and time themselves are not intuitions filled with sensory matter. Rather they are a case of "pure intuition" intuitus purus. In the pure intuition of time and space the intuited is given as an infinite, all-encompassing whole, such that any temporal or spatial part is but a limitation of the original pure intuition of time and space.

By contrast, in the case of concepts regarding the formal structure of the world cosmological concepts the whole succeeds the parts out of which it is made up. Moreover, concepts may contain other cognitions, such as other concepts, under themselves, but they do not contain those lower concepts in themselves; rather higher concepts are contained by lower concepts.

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By contrast, time and space as pure intuitions contain all possible times and spaces in them, and as infinite singular wholes they do not have features in common with anything outside them. Thus for Kant entirely different part-whole relations obtain in intuitions, specifically in pure intuitions, on the one hand, and in concepts, on the other hand. To be sure, the givenness of time and space as infinite intuitions cannot be understood on the model of the givenness of sensations, as coming to us from outside and as affecting us contingently.

Rather to call time and space "given" is to address the fundamental fact that prior to and independent of all sensory data we may receive, there is present in our mind a comprehensive structure ready to be filled with material to be provided by the senses such that all possible sensible cognition will be contained in this structure and marked by its formal features.

One might call the mode of givenness peculiar to pure intuitions their pre-givenness Vorgegebenheit. Instead he considers time and space as "acquired" acquisitus ; to be sure, not as acquired from the senses and particular sensations, but as acquired internally from the immanent law of the universal human cognitive constitution that shapes the taking-in of sensory data.

In historical terms, Kant's theory of time and space as forms of intuition and as pure intuitions brings together key elements of the earlier accounts of space and time provided by Newton and Leibniz. While the infinite magnitude of time and space in Kant retains elements of the Newtonian conception of space as an absolute entity or a cosmic container modeled on God's presence throughout the universe, their character as subjective forms of all sensory cognition is indebted to the Leibnizian conception of the phenomenal nature of time and space as the two orders that things take on under conditions of sensory cognition.

Unlike Newton, Kant defends the subjective origin of time and space. Unlike Leibniz he maintains their a priori character, their preceding rather than succeeding the things of which they are the ordering forms. And unlike either Newton or Leibniz Kant maintains that time and space are pure sensible intuitions. The very notion of a pure sensible intuition as the cognitive form of given infinite wholes is entirely original to Kant and underlies not only his account of space and time in the first Critique but also its mature theory about the cooperative relation between intuition and concept.

Hence the further development of Kant's thinking about intuitions and concepts that manifests itself in the first Critique deals not with the conveyances of sensibility as such but with their further non-sensory treatment by other powers of the mind. In particular, Kant contrasts the non-structured manner in which representations present themselves to the mind at the strictly sensory level with the form and structure introduced into spatial and temporal data by non-sensory means.

The term from the Inaugural-Dissertation designating the plenary but inarticulated sum-total of presentments in intuition as such, "varia," is rendered in the first Critique as "manifold" Mannigfaltiges and strictly distinguished from any order or structure brought to the manifold.

While the Inaugural-Dissertation had left the formal determination of space and time to particular spaces and particular times largely unexplained, the first Critique contains the main elements of a theory of the generation of specifically determined plural intuitions out of the unitary and singular proto-intuition of space and time.

The most detailed treatment of this problem is to be found in the changes revisions and additions introduced into the second edition of the first Critique , especially in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, although it should be stressed that Kant regarded the changes of the second edition not as substantial corrections but as improvements in the "manner of presentation" Darstellungsart of his doctrine, which remained, in the main, unchanged.

In the former regard, Kant stresses the complete lack of order among the manifold of intuition and the monopoly of the understanding for the formation of unity among representations of all kinds, regardless of whether they are intuitions or concepts.

In the latter regard, he emphasizes the amenability of the unordered manifold of intuition to conceptual ordering. At the most basic level, the joint venture of the manifold of intuition and the unity of conception manifests itself in the double nature of space and time as forms of intuition and as pure intuitions. In their capacity as universal forms of all sensible intuition, space and time do not yet provide unity to the infinitely varied "manifold" possible spatio-temporal arrays they contain.

As forms of intuition, space and time function merely as the basic ways or modes for sensational intake. Any shaping of space and time into determined regions and stretches of space and time requires, on Kant's analysis, the "comprehension of the manifold" Zusammenfassung des Manngifaltigen , by means of which the form of intuition becomes the intuition of the form of intuition or "formal intuition.

In the first Critique Kant's technical term for the "combination" Verbindung; conjunctio of a given manifold, is "synthesis" Synthesis. Rather he locates the origin of synthesis in an active, shaping power of the human mind.


The function for synthesizing cognitive items of all kinds "representations;" Vorstellungen is assigned to the "power of the imagination" Einbildungskraft. To be sure, the stages in the formation of cognition distinguished by Kant should not be taken as diachronically arranged phases in the actual coming about of cognition. Kant's interest in the first Critique is not a psychological interest in the factual genesis of cognition but a logical-normative interest in the universal subjective grounds that render cognition, in principle, possible.

The synthesis attributed by Kant to the power of the imagination consists most basically in the joining of sequentially apprehended stretches of time and regions of space into one "single" intuition so that the continuous flow of data receives articulation through primary structural features to be designated, in the context of their conceptual reconstruction, by concepts such as "before," after," "to the right of.

Kant terms such a figure an "image" Bild , drawing on the etymological proximity of "image" and "imagination. The function of the imagination that concerns Kant in the first Critique is not the reproduction of preexisting images but the productive function of first bringing the manifold to the formative condition of wholes that are set off from other regions of the manifold of space and time and endowed with a certain coherence provided by the delineation of a region of space or a stretch of time.

With regard to space, Kant characterizes the transition from the "pure," undetermined manifold to the determined intuition of parts of space as "description of a space" Beschreibung eines Raumes 60 , where the term "description" does not designate the recording of a previously existing spatial order but the original inscription of space through which a figure in space first comes about.

In order to convey the active nature of the "productive imagination" produktive Einbildungskraft 61 , Kant characterizes the "pure act of successive synthesis of the manifold in outer intuition" as "movement qua action of the subject" Bewegung, als Handlung des Subjekts , to be distinguished from objective movement as the dislocation of an object in space.

But the latter's contribution does not take the form of some external addition to the already accomplished synthesis of the imagination. On Kant's view, the understanding is always already operative in imaginational synthesis by providing the basic function of unity that guides or orients the synthesis of the manifold.

In a handwritten marginal emendation in his personal copy of the first edition of the first Critique, Kant replaced the passage, cited earlier and contained in the first and the second edition of the work, about the power of the imagination being a "function of the soul" with the more specific phrase, "a function of the understanding. On the contrary, synthetically unified space and time, along with the sensations located at determined spaces and times, first makes possible the formation of concepts.

Kant explains that he had introduced space as a pure intuition, and hence as a synthetic whole, on purpose already in the transcendental theory of sensibility Transcendental Aesthetic , in order to indicate that the pure intuition of space as such precedes all concepts of specific places and shapes in space.

He then points out that the presence of unity in space qua pure intuition, or in "space considered as an object" der Raum, als Gegenstand vorgestellt , "presupposes a synthesis that does not belong to the senses, but by means of which all concepts of space and time first become possible.

In the case of intuitions, each such singular representation contains a manifold "in itself" in sich and hence involves "many representations as contained in one and hence as composite" viel Vorstellungen als in einer mithin als zusammengesetzt. This composite nature of intuition as such exceeds the deliverances of sensibility and its mere forms pure manifold , but does not yet reflect the presence of concepts, rather enabling their formation. The synthesis of the imagination exercised, under the guidance of the understanding, on the manifold of the senses yields what Kant terms "appearances" Erscheinungen.

Continuing an ancient philosophical tradition going back to Plato, Kant uses the term to convey the difference between the way things might appear to someone, under certain conditions, etc. Most commentators on Kant's adaptation of the distinction between appearance and reality focus on the Kantian distinction between the things as they are in themselves in short: the things in themselves; Dinge an sich and their appearances, or the things as they come to be cognized under conditions of human sensibility, i.

While this onto-logical distinction, established in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first Critique, 69 is indeed the primary contrast underlying Kant's use of technical term "appearance," it is crucial not to overlook a second employment of the term "appearance" which opposes the appearance not to some unknown and unknowable thing that transcends our experience or to an unknown and unknowable side or aspect of a thing transcending our experience but to an as-yet unknown but knowable thing or side of a thing , one that is entirely within the range of our experience.

The latter distinction comes into play in the Transcendental Analytic of the first Critique, when Kant contrasts the way something appears to someone as a function of the particular way in which it is first given in intuition, with the way things might be independent of the varying conditions of sensible intuition, with the specification that the latter way of being is to be ascertained not by recourse to the senses but to the understanding.

The object which exceeds its varied actual and possible presentations to the senses or "appearances" is not intuited, or grasped directly, but is being thought. To say of the object that it is thought, as opposed to given, is to say that is a logical construct produced by the understanding on the material basis of given intuitions and serving to unify the latter. Drawing on Kant's discourse about the manifold of the senses being synthesized into an image, one can regard the object in the logical sense just outlined as that of which the relevant intuitions are images, yet which cannot be captured by any such image, or their sum-total, but only by the additional intellectual function of referring the intuitions to that of which they are the intuitions.

Kant also calls the object in the strong, logical sense the "transcendental object," 71 thereby indicating that is not a particular object but the universal objectivity function by means of which the variable cognitions of appearances are elevated to the cognition of an object that is invariant in relation to the changing conditions of its appearances.

In an alternative formulation of the same thought, Kant refers to the contribution that the understanding makes to the synthesis of the imagination as providing "transcendental content. Given the logical, thought-borne nature of objects and of the cognition of objects in Kant, the specific formal contribution that the understanding makes to the cognition of perception-invariant objects cannot consist in the grasp of some preexisting, absolute order of things.

Rather the pure concepts of the understanding categories formulate the universal subjective conditions under which appearances can be considered appearances of relatively stable, lawfully behaving objects in space and time. In the absence of such intellectual regularity conditions, appearances would not coalesce into objects.

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