E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity; trans. Alphonso Lingis, The Hague/Boston/ London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers & Duquesne University Press. In assuming this colossal responsibility, Levinas has changed the course of . ethics as first philosophy in Totality and Infinity; the importance of language. Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations With Philippe Nemo, Trans . Ephraim Meir, Jerusalem (Hebrew). Ephraim Meir. Loading Preview.
|Language:||English, Spanish, Arabic|
|Distribution:||Free* [*Register to download]|
Emmanuel Levinas - Ethics and Infinity-Duquesne University Press ().pdf. Randy Valenzuela. Download with Google Download with Facebook. Levinas Ethics Infinity - Download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read online. Ethics. PDF | Totality and Infinity, the title of a well-known work by Emmanuel Levinas, takes up a word which readers of Poetic Intention and of many other texts of.
The idea of infinity is itself a form of transcendence of the relation to the Other. Exteriority is achieved by having the idea of infinity. Levinas says that the idea of infinity is not a representation of infinity. The idea of infinity is an overflowing of finite thought by infinite content.
Infinity is produced by the overflowing of the intellect. The production of infinity cannot be separated from the idea of infinity. The idea of infinity is the mode of being of infinity. The idea of infinity does not proceed from the self, but is revealed to the self. Infinity is revealed as the infinite being of the absolutely other.
To have the idea of infinity is to be aware of the infinity of the Other. Thus, the idea of infinity maintains the exteriority of the Other. The Other is absolutely other than the same. The Other is everything other than the self. The Other is infinite being which overflows the idea of infinity.
The Other is an infinitely transcendent reality. Levinas says that the idea of infinity requires the separation of the same from the Other. This separation is a fall of the same and Other from totality. The level of separation is a level of fallenness. But this fall from totality produces infinity. The idea of infinity is moral in that it is an idea of what the finite being lacks in relation to infinity. Thus, the self can transcend this relation by a welcoming of the Other. Indeed, to have the idea of infinity is to have already welcomed the Other.
Subjectivity is a welcoming of the Other. Levinas distinguishes between the idea of totality and the idea of infinity. The idea of totality seeks to integrate the other and the same into a totality, but the idea of infinity maintains the separation between the other and the same.
According to Levinas, the idea of totality is theoretical, but the idea of infinity is moral. Constituting itself in the very movement wherein being responsible for the other devolves on it, subjectivity goes to the point of substitution for the Other. It assumes the condition — or the uncondition — of hostage. Subjectivity as such is initially hostage; it answers to the point of expiating for others.
One can appear scandalized by this utopian and, for an I, inhuman conception. But the humanity of the human — the true life — is absent. The humanity in historical and objective being, the very breakthrough of the subjective, of the human psychism in its original vigilance or sobering up, is being which undoes its condition of being: This is what is meant by the title of the book: Otherwise than Being. The ontological condition undoes itself, or is undone, in the human condition or uncondition.
To be human means to live as if one were not a being among beings. As if, through human spirituality, the categories of being inverted into an "otherwise than being. The "otherwise than being," in truth, has no verb which would designate the event of its un-rest, its dis-inter-estedness, its putting-into-question of this being — or this estedness — of the being.
It is I who support the Other and am responsible for him. One thus sees that in the human subject, at the same time as a total subjection, my primogeniture manifests itself.
My responsibility is untransferable. No one could replace me. In fact, it is a matter of saying the very identity of the human I starting from responsibility, that is, starting from 2 Cf.
New American Library, , p. Responsibility is what is incumbent on me exclusively, and what, humanly, I cannot refuse. This charge is a supreme dignity of the unique. I am I in the sole measure that I am responsible, a non-interchangeable I. I can substitute myself for everyone, but no one can substitute himself for me. Such is my inalienable identity of subject.
It is in this precise sense that Dostoyevsky said: Flag for inappropriate content. Related titles. Levinas - Totality and Infinity an Essay on Exteriority. Jump to Page. Search inside document. From Ethics and Infinity: Nicholas Jeffries. Masaki C Matsumoto. Jean-luc Boutin. You Know.
Migz Dimayacyac. Ridha Al Qadri.
David Crauwels. Charlie Miller. Guido Amarilla. Amy Dunville. Remmert Ouweltjes. Vince Volle. Jay Michael Cordero. Wilshire - Pragmatism, Neopragmatism, And Phenomenology. Arina Keresztes. Alejandro Molina. More From Lewis Griffin.
Marcio Renato Pinheiro da Silva. Popular in Philosophical Movements. Adisty Paramitha ALbanying. Paulo Maya. Boubaker Jaziri. Andrey Maidansky. Reflections on the Relationship Between Utopia and Heterotopia.
Elmehdi Mayou. Diana Badulescu. Ximena U. Collapse Vol. Speculative Realism. March Robin Mackay Associate Editor: Damian Veal. Cengiz Erdem.
Franceska Fajhner. Between Reason and History: Habermas and the Idea of Progress. Chris Hughes. Ryan Krahn. Seema Ladsaria. Bochenski Auth. Hanna Backman. Anselm and the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God. Abhinav Anand. Amanda Muniz. Lore Bercuci. I feared a much graver objection: How is it that one can punish and repress? How is it that there is justice? I answer that it is the fact of the multiplicity of men and the presence of someone else next to the Other, which condition the laws and establish justice.
If I am alone with the Other, I owe him everything; but there is someone else. Do I know what my neighbor is in relation to someone else? Do I know if someone else has an understanding with him or his victim? Who is my neighbor? It is consequently necessary to weigh, to think, to judge, in comparing the incomparable. The interpersonal relation I establish with the Other, I must also establish with other men; it is thus a necessity to moderate this privilege of the Other; from whence comes justice.
Justice, exercised through institutions, which are inevitable, must always be held in check by the initial interpersonal relation. Is it starting from this ethical experience that you construct an "ethics"? For it follows, ethics is made up of rules; it is necessary to establish these rules? In fact I do not believe that all philosophy should be programmatic. It is Husserl above all who brought up the idea of a program of philosophy.
One can without doubt construct an ethics in function of what I have just said, but this is not my own theme. Being is embraced in the truth.
Even if the truth is considered as never definitive, there is a promise of a more complete and adequate truth. Without doubt, the finite being that we are cannot in the final account complete the task of knowledge; but in the limit where this task is accomplished, it consists in making the other become the Same. On the other hand, the idea of the Infinite implies a thought of the Unequal.
I start from the Cartesian idea of the Infinite, where the ideatum of this idea, that is, what this idea aims at, is infinitely greater than the very act through which one thinks it. There is a disproportion between the act and that to which the act gives access. One must thus admit to an infinite God who has put the idea of the Infinite into us.
But it is not the proof Descartes sought that interests me here. I am thinking here of the astonishment at this dis- proportion between what he calls the "objective reality" and the "formal reality" of the idea of God, of the very paradox so anti-Greek of an idea "put" into me, even though Socrates taught us that it is impossible to put an idea into a thought without it already having been found there. Now, in the face such as I describe its approach, is produced the same exceeding of the act by that to which it leads.
In the access to the face there is certainly also an access to the idea of God. In Descartes, the idea of the Infinite remains a theoretical idea, a contemplation, a knowledge. For my part, I think that the relation to the Infinite is not a knowledge, but a Desire.
I have tried to describe the difference between Desire and need by the fact that Desire cannot be satisfied; that Desire in some way nourishes itself on its own hungers and is augmented by its satisfaction; that Desire is like a thought which thinks more than it thinks, or more than what it thinks.
It is a paradoxical structure, without doubt, but one which is no more so than this presence of the Infinite in a finite act. Chapter Eight Ph. Husserl had already spoken of responsibility, but of a responsibility for the truth; Heidegger had spoken of authenticity; as for yourself, what do you understand by responsibility? For I describe subjectivity in ethical terms. Ethics, here, does not supplement a preceding existential base; the very node of the subjective is knotted in ethics understood as responsibility.
I understand responsibility as responsibility for the Other, thus as responsibility for what is not my deed, or for what does not even matter to me; or which precisely does matter to me, is met by me as face.
You recall what we said: meeting the face is not of the order of pure and simple perception, of the intentionality which goes toward adequation.
Positively, we will say that since the Other looks at me, I am responsible for him, without even haying taken on responsibilities in his regard; his responsibility is incumbent on me. It is responsibility that goes beyond what I do.
Usually, one is responsible for what one does oneself. I say, in Otherwise than Being, that responsibility is initially a for the Other. This means that I am responsible for his very responsibility. Subjectivity is not for itself; it is, once again, initially for another. In the book, the proximity of the Other is presented as the fact that the Other is not simply close to me in space, or close like a parent, but he approaches me essentially insofar as I feel myself insofar as I am responsible for him.
It is a structure that in nowise resembles the intentional relation which in knowledge attaches us to the object to no matter what object, be it a human object. Proximity does not revert to this intentionality; in particular it does not revert to the fact that the Other is known to me. The tie with the Other is knotted only as responsibility, this moreover, whether accepted or refused, whether knowing or not knowing how to assume it, whether able or unable to do something concrete for the Other.
To say: here I am [me voici].