library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data. Deleuze, Gilles. [Difference et repetition. English]. Difference and repetition/Gilles De1euze: translated by. Gilles Deleuze. Difference and Repetition. Translated by. Paul Patton. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS. NEW YORK There is a great difference between writing history of philosophy and writing with enthusiasm, Difference and Repetition was the first book in which I tried to ' do.
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A revised, expanded and fully up-to-date critical introduction to Deleuze's most important work of philosophyBy critically analysing Deleuze's methods. Deleuze - Difference and Repetition - Ebook download as PDF File .pdf) or view presentation slides online. Deluze Difference and Repetition. Deleuze's Difference and ruthenpress.info - Ebook download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read book online.
Moreover, Deleuze's praise of immanence would seem to deny that there is any outside which orients and constrains thinking; this looks like a conception of subjectivity as hyperbolic and untenable as Sartre's. The unconscious becomes an absurd doctrine if we think of it as a series of representations that just happens to fall below the threshold of consciousness.
Absurd, yet often difficult to avoid; it seems that Freud himself often fell into this error. If it is beneath or beyond representations, then how is it possible to speak of it at all? He admits to a certain modesty, indirection, restraint in what he as a philosopher is able to say.
That does not appear to be Deleuze's approach. The imperative to think without representations seems to give total license to nonsense at times. The passage quoted above continues In this sense it is not even clear that thought, in so far as it constitutes the dynamism peculiar to philosophical systems, may be related to a substantial, completed and well-constituted subject, such as the Cartestian Cogito: thought is, rather, one of those terrible movements which can be sustained only under the conditions of a larval subject Would it be pedantic to look for a method in a sentence like that, Deleuze's equivalent of phenomenological reflection or the logical analysis of language?
Is he saying that in order to do philosophy we should first fry our brains on hallucinogens? Just read the central chapter, "The Image of Thought. What else could it be?
Given that I likened it to a prose poem, I should add that as such it often succeeds fantastically. I've never been a fan of the shrill hysteria and sloganeering of the Guattari collaborations, but Deleuze himself could fucking write.
A well-known test in psychology involves a monkey who is supposed to find food in boxes of one particular color amidst others of various colors: there comes a paradoxical period during which the number of 'errors' diminishes even though the monkey does not yet posses the 'knowledge' or 'truth' of a solution in each case; propitious moment in which the philosopher-monkey opens up to truth, himself producing the true, but only to the extent that he begins to penetrate the coloured thickness of a problem.
On the one hand, damn!
Foucault famously loved Deleuze's early books and, at a time when phenomenology was part of the philosophical establishment in France, said that they represented the extreme opposite of Merleau-Ponty's way of thinking. Throughout his work MP took great pains to show, against Descartes, that it's not really possible to doubt the world. It's like claiming to behold a square circle.
You can say these words but they don't mean anything.
Phenomenology of Perception is a book that at times leans heavily on common sense. All MP's analysis depend on their being such a thing as a norm of perception, which can be contrasted with pathological cases.
These pathological cases, in turn, must ultimately be understood against a ground or horizon of meaning. Intensity, in the form of certain intensive quantities, thus gives rise to perception. This happens, however, in a paradoxical way: intensity brings about these organizational principles and perceptions, but is at the same time cancelled out or covered over by them.
I will illustrate this paradoxical aspect of intensity through Deleuze's elaboration of what perception of extension, and of its dimensions, presupposes Deleuze, , p.
At the origin of the perception of depth, in its own turn, lies distance as the intensity of sensation: that which gives us a perception of depth is the decreasing intensity of the impressions of what is further or deeper. The intensity of depth is thus presupposed in the dimensions of extension. It is at the same time annulled by the latter since, when we talk about dimensions of extension, these become interchangeable and homogenous every depth can be seen as a length or width , which makes the differential aspect disappear; and when we talk about depth as distance seen in terms of length, which is dividable into homogeneous parts, the original heterogeneity of intensity is covered over too.
This shows how intensity brings about perception, while at the same time becoming masked by that which it gave rise to: it leads to the apprehension of a quality for instance being distant or close by , which emphasizes continuity and resemblance of this one quality with different degrees , and thereby cancels out difference.
As a result, we only know intensity as already developed and thus evened out in extensity, since it is only sensible in this form. This explains our tendency to see intensity as a greater quantity of a certain quality or sensation. Is there no way, then, to get an idea of what it would be like to perceive intensity itself, beyond its disguise in extension and quality?
Nonetheless, we can get close to such an experience in its pure state through the experience of vertigo ibid. Vertigo is the experience of the intensity of depth in itself, represented neither as a quality nor as extension: it does imply distance depth , but it is not identical to it and cannot be reduced to it.
Moreover, it is an overwhelming and perplexing experience; given that it is not perceived through one particular sense, as well as the fact that it can impede our reasoning and perception, one could say that it entails a distortion of the senses. Common sense It thus seems that there is a natural tendency to organize intensity and to cover it up in favour of new, understandable and workable concepts such as quality, depth and length, in order to make it workable and recognizable—which it is not in its pure form.
Consequently, it looks as if Deleuze's notion of common sense is essentially related to a way of perceiving, which rules out the experience of intensity. We will see why Deleuze believes common sense fulfils this function; and how it leads to a transformation of intensity. The model of recognition is a thinking pattern, which depends on a number of suppositions. This model presupposes that the same object can be apprehended by different faculties: it can be conceived, remembered, imagined or perceived seen, touched, tasted, etc.
But we can also think of an example from everyday life in order to illustrate this: when we recognize someone on the street, our memory, imagination and visual perception collaborate, all having this someone as their common object, which allows us to recognize the person in question. Indeed, these examples presuppose a given common element or context of application, which allows the collaboration of the different faculties.
This common element is, for Deleuze, no one thing in particular—which explains that this model is applicable to any object of recognition—but a certain form, namely the form of identity: the application of the different faculties to one and the same object presupposes the identity of the object in question—whatever object this may be. Common sense, meaning the collaboration of the faculties in recognition, thus presupposes an identical subject in time and, correlatively, an identical object in time.
This makes sense since one cannot talk of recognition if that which is recognized is not already the object of a certain representation. According to Deleuze, representation necessarily entails certain constraints. To put it simply, Deleuze points to the fact that the representative model only allows for certain possibilities: in representing something, one can recognize a conceptual identity, an analogy of judgement, a similarity in perception or an opposition to something imagined; through representation one can thus only think identity, analogy, similarity and opposition.
As Deleuze observes, if difference can only be represented as identity, analogy, opposition or similitude, then representation reduces it to the difference between two elements, meaning it is reduced to a principle of comparison.
In contrast to this, Deleuze defends a notion of pure difference and of pure intensity, showing that these can neither be experienced under the rule of common sense, which regulates the use of our faculties in such a manner that pure intensity is blocked out, nor conceived according to the model of recognition and representation the correlates of common sense because these latter allow us to think of difference only as a comparative term. As a result, if Deleuze remarks that we always perceive intensity as already developed in extension and under quality, this is because common sense organizes it and gives it an extended form in representation.
This is also what happens in the perception of distance and the conceptualization of extension: relying on the judgement that the situation is analogous with previous instances, difference of intensity does not confuse us since it leads for example to the judgement that something is close by or far away and thus to a representation in terms of distance.
On account of the recognition of the identity between what is present in a particular experience on the one hand, and conceptions that we have on the other, our perception of extension is represented as containing dimensions and distances, which organize it and make it workable. Desire is considered impersonal and intensive by Deleuze and Guattari, and thus similar to a force or an impersonal drive traversing reality; it might affect us with a certain pressure or intensity, thereby making something sensible for us; or it might invest materiality, perhaps resulting in material change.
If it is the role of social reality to organize and codify desire, then common sense must be essentially social. In this case, a brief illustration of the manner in which the socius codifies desire for Deleuze and Guattari can enhance the picture of common sense sketched in the previous section. In breast feeding, when breast and mouth connect to each other, they each have a certain degree of intensity, which is a certain amount of energy or pressure, driving them to connect.
What Deleuze and Guattari would call the sucking machine, or the desire for sucking and feeding, exercises pressure on both the breast and the mouth. According to them, this happens primarily on a purely impersonal level that does not signify or lack anything 9 : it is really intensity, an impersonal pressure, which makes the mouth and the breast connect. Additionally, this prohibition brings about a codification that regulates desire: I am not allowed to desire my mother or my sister and, depending on the particular socius, my cousin ; I am a boy or a girl so I have to desire boys or girls; or at least a global person, again depending on the particular socius.
This codification through the socius thus selects and organizes intensities, and it changes the intensive impersonal desire into personal meaningful desire. Common sense thus functions in the same way social codification does with regard to intensity: when intensity becomes sensible as a representation of, for instance, quality or distance, it produces that which covers it up and organizes it—just like social codification finds its origin in intensity, to then neutralize it.
This means that he lives in the midst of affects that are not canalized and regulated by social codifications such as the one resulting from the incest prohibition and common sense, of which the function even seems to be the repression of the intensive order in favour of an organization and a neutralization of pure intensity, and thus of a workable and recognizable, extended and qualified, experience of reality.
If this is the case, the schizophrenic would live amidst pure forces and affects, unable to recognize, represent or organize them, and thus experiencing each sensation and each thought as unrecognizable, perplexing and confusing, in a distortion of the senses similar to vertigo. Furthermore, the schizophrenic's perception would be differential and thus fragmented: if intensity is not organized in extension, then there is no homogenous perception of extension space , of qualities, of objects or even of oneself and others.
According to such a principle, the reality of the real was posed as a divisible abstract quantity, whereas the real was divided up into qualified unities, into distinct qualitative forms.
But now the real is a product that envelops the distances within intensive quantities. As mentioned above, Deleuze and Guattari actually want to understand the schizophrenic experience in a positive way. I will now point to how this perspective leads to an understanding of the schizophrenic's experience and expression.
In this order, this differential and fragmented flux of affects, a change in an affect an increase or decrease in a certain sensation, or the appearance of a new affect or a change in space movement , means a change in nature that can be expressed designated or acted out. The schizophrenic's expressions seem incoherent and confused to us, however, because he does not use the organization and representations of common sense and associates in a different manner.
I am a red Indian. I am a Negro. I am a Chinaman. I am a Japanese. I am a foreigner, a stranger. I am a sea bird.
I am a land bird. I am the tree of Tolstoy. I am the roots of Tolstoy I am husband and wife in one. I love my wife. Usually these kinds of utterances are regarded as delusional identifications.
As a matter of fact, if a schizophrenic tells us he is a dog and begins to act like one, thereby simulating the content of his utterance, we conclude he is delusional: this man is not a dog.
Whether the designations and simulations mentioned above could function as organizational principles for the schizophrenic, in a similar way common sense does, is not clear.
It seems, however, that they do not. Codification, on the contrary, allows the neutralization of some things in favour of others, thereby avoiding an overwhelming experience. Catatonia would thus be the state the schizophrenic is in when he wants to, or is forced to, block out something, since he then needs to barricade the whole flux of affects due to his lack of codification.
Therefore, according to them it does not help to impose a common sense organization upon the schizophrenic: they suggest that, if the schizophrenic lives on the intensive order, it is exactly because he cannot, or does not want to, function within the structure of the socius.
Imposing the structure of the socius on him would lead to catatonic and autistic schizophrenia,that is to schizophrenia in the clinical sense. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between schizophrenia as a creative process, which has great artistic and revolutionary potential e. Deleuze and Guattari have often been accused of romanticizing schizophrenia and of describing the schizophrenic as the true revolutionary or artist.
I hope I was able to show that they actually do not idealize schizophrenia as a mental state. According to them, the schizophrenic individual is the result of the degeneration of a potentially creative or productive schizophrenic process, whose trajectory has foundered and descended into a black hole, absorbing all productivity.
If we are to take Deleuze and Guattari seriously, then we should always set aside the prejudices that come along with common sense and its representations in dealing with schizophrenia, seeing as these two registers are incompatible. Secondly, this entails that a clinical approach to schizophrenia should not be directed towards socializing or curing the schizophrenic individual by imposing a structure onto him.