The colonizer and the colonized pdf


First published in Britain in hardcover and paperback by Souvenir Press ( Educational & Academic) Ltd in. T his edition first published in paperback in the. I felt that to understand the failure of their undertaking, that of a mixed marriage in a colony, I irst had to understand the colonizer and the colonized, perhaps the. His best-known nonfiction work is "The Colonizer and the Colonized", about Notes on Colonizer and Colonized are the work of ASDIC (Okogyeamon ).

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The Colonizer And The Colonized Pdf

Albert Memmi in The coloniser and the colonised (), speaks of the ' mummification of the cotonised society' (l6a) which does not allow it to grow, since it. PDF | Tulisan ini mengemukakan pentingnya pemahaman penerjemah mengenai “kata” dari sebuah karya. Kata “coloniser” dan “colonised”. Contents. The Nature of Colonization — Empires, Land, and Cul- tures. 6. The Ideology of ties of both the colonized and the colonizer with pathological effects .

Reviewed by: Decolonization and the Decolonized. University of Minnesota Press, Translated by Robert Bononno. Albert Memmi is principally known for his The Colonizer and the Colonized , originally published in , a brilliant indictment of the colonial system and its social and political effects on those caught up in its oppressive embrace. He has followed up after fifty years with a look at the decolonized, an attempt to understand what has happened since colonialism. Yet whereas in the first work Memmi was writing from the point of view of one who had experienced the colonial situation from within, he now clearly writes from the perspective of a European commenting from afar. It is as if the diaspora experience has led to such a process of acculturation that the author has lost the capacity to think through the lenses that made his initial book such a success. The author's main concern is to discuss the Arabo Islamic world of the Middle East and not so much Africa, although he maintains that his "portrait" can be generalized to the Third World as a whole. The book consists of a series of general observations of a journalistic kind combined with a number of examples taken completely at random and bereft of historical context. For example, his list of contemporary Third World military leaders includes 16—17 Juan Peron, Hugo Chavez, Stalin, Tito, Idi Amin, Fidel Castro, and Mao Zedong, as if the mere fact of wearing a uniform were sufficient to situate all these individuals in the same category of despotic military dictator. Even by the liberal criteria to which the author adheres, it can easily be recalled that a number of these individuals were elected by universal suffrage, and moreover that the West has had its share of military men in power. It is these kinds of crude journalistic images of a Third World governed by corrupt tyrannical dictators beset by economic and political crises along with massive poverty and an apathetic population that form the core of Memmi's "portrait.

Societies all need to find a way to balance individual egoism and sociability and to overcome the adversities that stem from the physical environment. From this perspective, culture itself, rather than rationality, is the universal human capacity.

Unlike many other eighteenth and nineteenth century political philosophers, Diderot did not assume that non-Western societies were necessarily primitive e. One of the key issues that distinguished critics from proponents of colonialism and imperialism was their view of the relationship between culture, history and progress.

Many of the influential philosophers writing in France and England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had assimilated some version of the developmental approach to history that was associated with the Scottish Enlightenment. It would therefore be incorrect to conclude that a developmental theory of history is distinctive of the liberal tradition; nevertheless, given that figures of the Scottish Enlightenment such as Ferguson and Smith were among its leading expositors, it is strongly associated with liberalism.

Smith himself opposed imperialism for economic reasons. He felt that relations of dependence between metropole and periphery distorted self-regulating market mechanisms and worried that the cost of military domination would be burdensome for taxpayers Pitts The idea that civilization is the culmination of a process of historical development, however, proved useful in justifying imperialism.

According to Uday Mehta, liberal imperialism was the product of the interaction between universalism and developmental history A core doctrine of liberalism holds that all individuals share a capacity for reason and self-government. The theory of developmental history, however, modifies this universalism with the notion that these capacities only emerge at a certain stage of civilization McCarthy For example, according to John Stuart Mill hereafter Mill , savages do not have the capacity for self-government because of their excessive love of freedom.

Serfs, slaves, and peasants in barbarous societies, on the other hand, may be so schooled in obedience that their capacity for rationality is stifled. Only commercial society produces the material and cultural conditions that enable individuals to realize their potential for freedom and self-government.

According to this logic, civilized societies like Great Britain are acting in the interest of less-developed peoples by governing them. Mill, a life-long employee of the British East India Company, recognized that despotic government by a foreign people could lead to injustice and economic exploitation. These abuses, if unchecked, could undermine the legitimacy and efficacy of the imperial project.

In Considerations on Representative Government , Mill identifies four reasons why foreign e. European peoples are not suited to governing colonies. First, foreign politicians are unlikely to have the knowledge of local conditions that is necessary to solve problems of public policy effectively. Second, given cultural, linguistic, and often religious differences between colonizers and colonized, the colonizers are unlikely to sympathize with the native peoples and are likely to act tyrannically.

Third, even if the colonizers really try to treat the native peoples fairly, their natural tendency to sympathize with those similar to themselves other foreign colonists or merchants would likely lead to distorted judgment in cases of conflict.

Finally, according to Mill, colonists and merchants go abroad in order to acquire wealth with little effort or risk, which means that their economic activity often exploits the colonized country rather than developing it.

Recent scholarship, however, has challenged the view of Burke as an opponent of imperialism. Members of this specialized body would have the training to acquire relevant knowledge of local conditions.

Paid by the government, they would not personally benefit from economic exploitation and could fairly arbitrate conflicts between colonists and indigenous people. Mill, however, was not able to explain how to ensure good government where those wielding political power were not accountable to the population. Nineteenth century liberal thinkers held a range of views on the legitimacy of foreign domination and conquest.

Colonies would provide an outlet for excess population that caused disorder in France. Tocqueville also suggested that imperial endeavors would incite a feeling of patriotism that would counterbalance the modern centrifugal forces of materialism and class conflict. Tocqueville was actively engaged in advancing the project of French colonization of Algeria. As a member of the Chamber of Deputies, Tocqueville argued in favor of expanding the French presence in Algeria.

Instead, Tocqueville defended controversial tactics such as the destruction of crops, confiscation of land, and seizure of unarmed civilians. The stability of the regime, he felt, depended on the ability of the colonial administration to provide good government to the French settlers.

Tocqueville emphasized that the excessive centralization of decision-making in Paris combined with the arbitrary practices of the local military leadership meant that French colonists had no security of property, let alone the political and civil rights that they were accustomed to France.

Tocqueville was untroubled by the use of martial law against indigenous peoples, but felt that it was counterproductive when applied to the French. For Tocqueville, the success of the French endeavor in Algeria depended entirely on attracting large numbers of permanent French settlers. Given that it was proving impossible to win the allegiance of the indigenous people, France could not hold Algeria without creating a stable community of colonists.

The natives were to be ruled through military domination and the French were to be enticed to settle through the promise of economic gain in an environment that reproduced, as much as possible, the cultural and political life of France.

Recent scholarship has also drawn attention to the writings of less canonical figures Bell In Mr.

The Colonizer and the Colonized Quotes

Mothercountry, Keally McBride focuses on the career of James Stephen and uses new archival research to explore the gap between the practice of colonial administration and the ideal of the rule of law.

In Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism, Karuna Mantena challenges the idea that liberal notions of progress and civilization played a central role in the justification of Victorian empire. Mantena shows that the work of Victorian legal scholar Henry Maine played an important role in the shift toward a new culturalism that emphasized the dangers and difficulties of trying to civilize native peoples. Marxism and Leninism In recent years, scholars have devoted less attention to the debates on colonialism within the Marxist tradition.


This reflects the waning influence of Marxism in the academy and in political practice. Marxism, however, has influenced both post-colonial theory and anti-colonial independence movements around the world. Marxists have drawn attention to the material basis of European political expansion and developed concepts that help explain the persistence of economic exploitation after the end of direct political rule.

Although Marx never developed a theory of colonialism, his analysis of capitalism emphasized its inherent tendency to expand in search of new markets. In his classic works such as The Communist Manifesto, Grundrisse, and Capital, Marx predicted that the bourgeoisie would continue to create a global market and undermine both local and national barriers to its own expansion. Expansion is a necessary product of the core dynamic of capitalism: overproduction.

Competition among producers drives them to cut wages, which in turn leads to a crisis of under-consumption. The only way to prevent economic collapse is to find new markets to absorb excess consumer goods.

From a Marxist perspective, some form of imperialism is inevitable. By exporting population to resource rich foreign territories, a nation creates a market for industrial goods and a reliable source of natural resources.

Alternately, weaker countries can face the choice of either voluntarily admitting foreign products that will undermine domestic industry or submitting to political domination, which will accomplish the same end. In a series of newspaper articles published in the s in the New York Daily Tribune, Marx specifically discussed the impact of British colonialism in India.

His analysis was consistent with his general theory of political and economic change. He described India as an essentially feudal society experiencing the painful process of modernization. He reached this conclusion because he believed incorrectly that agricultural land in India was owned communally.

According to Marx, oriental despotism emerged in India because agricultural productivity depended on large-scale public works such as irrigation that could only be financed by the state. This meant that the state could not be easily replaced by a more decentralized system of authority. In Western Europe, feudal property could be transformed gradually into privately owned, alienable property in land. In India, communal land ownership made this impossible, thereby blocking the development of commercial agriculture and free markets.

His account of British domination, however, reflects the same ambivalence that he shows towards capitalism in Europe. In both cases, Marx recognizes the immense suffering brought about during the transition from feudal to bourgeois society while insisting that the transition is both necessary and ultimately progressive.

He argues that the penetration of foreign commerce will cause a social revolution in India. For Marx, this upheaval has both positive and negative consequences. When peasants lose their traditional livelihoods, there is a great deal of human suffering, but he also points out that traditional village communities are hardly idyllic; they are sites of caste oppression, slavery, misery, and cruelty. The first stage of the modernization process is entirely negative, because poor people pay heavy taxation to support British rule and endure the economic upheaval that results from the glut of cheaply produced English cotton.

Even though Marx believed that British rule was motivated by greed and exercised through cruelty, he felt it was still the agent of progress. Lenin developed his analysis of Western economic and political domination in his pamphlet Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism see Other Internet Resources.

Lenin took a more explicitly critical view of imperialism. He noted that imperialism was a technique which allowed European countries to put off the inevitable domestic revolutionary crisis by exporting their own economic burdens onto weaker states.

Pre-colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development

Lenin argued that late-nineteenth century imperialism was driven by the economic logic of late-capitalism. The falling rate of profit caused an economic crisis that could only be resolved through territorial expansion. Capitalist conglomerates were compelled to expand beyond their national borders in pursuit of new markets and resources.

In a sense, this analysis is fully consistent with Marx, who saw European colonialism as continuous with the process of internal expansion within states and across Europe.

Both Marx and Lenin thought that colonialism and imperialism resulted from the same logic that drove the economic development and modernization of peripheral areas in Europe. Since late capitalism was organized around national monopolies, the competition for markets took the form of military competition between states over territories that could be dominated for their exclusive economic benefit.

Marxist theorists including Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Kautsky, and Nikolai Bukharin also explored the issue of imperialism.

Kautsky challenges the assumption that imperialism would lead to the development of the areas subjected to economic exploitation. He suggests that imperialism is a relatively permanent relationship structuring the interactions between two types of countries.

Young Although imperialism initially took the form of military competition between capitalist countries, it would result in collusion between capitalist interests to maintain a stable system of exploitation of the non-developed world.

The colonizer and the colonized

The most influential contemporary proponent of this view is Immanuel Wallerstein, who is known for world-systems theory. According to this theory, the world-system is a relatively stable set of relations between core and peripheral states. This international division of labor is structured to benefit the core states Wallerstein — and transfers resources from the periphery to the core.

Post-colonial Theory From the perspective of world-systems theory, the economic exploitation of the periphery does not necessarily require direct political or military domination. In a similar vein, contemporary literary theorists have drawn attention to practices of representation that reproduce a logic of subordination that endures even after former colonies gain independence.

The term orientalism described a structured set of concepts, assumptions, and discursive practices that were used to produce, interpret, and evaluate knowledge about non-European peoples. Unlike previous studies that focused on the economic or political logics of colonialism, Said drew attention to the relationship between knowledge and power.

Orientalism can be seen as an attempt to extend the geographical and historical terrain of the poststructuralist critique of Western epistemology. Said uses the term Orientalism in several different ways. First, Orientalism is a specific field of academic study about the Middle East and Asia, albeit one that Said conceives quite expansively to encompass history, sociology, literature, anthropology and especially philology. He also identifies it as a practice that helps define Europe by creating a stable depiction of its other, its constitutive outside.

Finally, Said emphasizes that it is also a mode of exercising authority by organizing and classifying knowledge about the Orient. This discursive approach is distinct both from the materialist view that knowledge is simply a reflection of economic or political interests and from the idealist view that scholarship is disinterested and neutral. Following Foucault, Said describes discourse as a form of knowledge that is not used instrumentally in service of power but rather is itself a form of power.

Spivak questions the idea of transparent subaltern speech. But experience itself is constituted through representation; therefore denying the problem of representation does not make it go away but only makes it harder to recognize.

According to Ahmad, Spivak is concerned with narratives of capitalism rather than the institutional structures and material effects of capitalism as a mode of production. Vivek Chibber and Dipesh Chakrabarty have taken up these issues.

In his influential book Provincializing Europe, Chakrabarty argues that distinctively European concepts such as disenchanted space, secular time, and sovereignty inform the social sciences. When these standards are treated as universal, the third world is seen as incomplete or lacking. Chibber challenges the position. Chibber advances a critique of Subaltern Studies and defends universal categories such as capitalism, class, rationality, and objectivity.

He argues that these categories need not be reductionist or Eurocentric and that they are useful in illuminating the motivation of political actors and the structural constraints faced by leaders in countries such as India. This debate reflects a tension that runs through the field of postcolonial studies. Although some thinkers draw on both Marxism and poststructuralism, the two theories have different goals, methods, and assumptions.

The Colonizer and the Colonized Quotes

In the humanities, postcolonial theory tends to reflect the influence of poststructuralist thought, while theorists of decolonization focus on social history, economics, and political institutions. Some scholars have begun to question the usefulness of the concept post-colonial theory. Like the idea of the Scottish four-stages theory, a theory with which it would appear to have little in common, the very concept of post-colonialism seems to rely on a progressive understanding of history McClintock It suggests, perhaps unwittingly, that the core concepts of hybridity, alterity,particularity, and multiplicity may lead to a kind of methodological dogmatism or developmental logic.

Thus, the critical impulse behind post-colonial theory has turned on itself, drawing attention to the way that it may itself be marked by the utopian desire to transcend the trauma of colonialism Gandhi Recognition and Revolt in Settler-Colonial States Indigenous scholars have articulated a critique of post-colonialism, noting that the concept obscures the continued existence of settler-colonial states.

One point of controversy in contemporary Indigenous political theory literature is the extent to which it is desirable to participate in colonial legal and political institutions in order to transform them. At the center of this debate is the question of whether institutional accommodation aimed towards reconciliation advances indigenous interests or further reproduces the conditions of domination that only perpetuate the historical settler-colonial relationship. One group of scholars emphasizes the politics of refusal and resurgence.

In Mohawk Interruptus: A Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States , Audra Simpson argues that the contemporary democratic practices of recognition transform indigenous peoples from sovereign nations into ethnic minority citizens. She suggests that the struggle for self-government requires a politics of refusal. The problem with the politics of reconciliation is that it remains in a system that is guided by the logic of Western liberalism and structured by its attendant hierarchies.

Motivated by the richness of anecdotal evidence and case studies documenting the importance of ethnic-specific institutional traits, in this study we explore in a systematic way the relationship between pre-colonial ethnic institutions, political centralization in particular, and regional development. We utilize data from the pioneering work of Murdock , , who has mapped the spatial distribution of African ethnicities and compiled various quantitative indicators reflecting political institutions, cultural, and economic traits of several ethnic groups around colonization.

To overcome the paucity of economic indicators across African ethnic homelands, we combine the anthropological data with satellite images of light density at night. Our analysis shows that the complexity and hierarchical structure of pre-colonial ethnic institutions correlate significantly with contemporary regional development, as reflected in light density at night.

This correlation does not necessarily imply a causal relationship, because one cannot rule out the possibility that other ethnic characteristics and hard-to-account-for factors drive the association. Nevertheless this correlation obtains across numerous permutations. First, it is robust to an array of controls related to the disease environment, land endowments, and natural resources at the local level. Accounting properly for geography is important as there is a fierce debate in the literature on whether the correlation between institutional and economic development is driven by hard-to-account-for geographical features.

Second, the strong positive association between pre-colonial political centralization and regional development retains its economic and statistical significance, when we solely examine within-country variation. Including country fixed effects is crucial since we are able to account for all country-specific, time-invariant features. Third, regressing luminosity on a variety of alternative pre-colonial ethnic characteristics, such as occupational specialization, economic organization, the presence of polygyny, slavery, and proxies of early development, we find that political centralization is the only robust correlate of contemporary economic performance.

This reassures that the uncovered positive association does not reflect differences in observable cultural and economic attributes across African ethnicities. Fourth, the positive correlation between ethnic political complexity and regional development prevails when we limit our analysis within pairs of neighboring homelands falling in the same country where ethnicities with different pre-colonial institutions reside.

These patterns obtain both when the unit of analysis is the ethnic homeland and when we exploit the finer structure of the luminosity data to obtain multiple observations pixels for each homeland. Hence, although we do not have random assignment in ethnic institutions, the results clearly point out that traits manifested in differences in the pre-colonial institutional legacy matter crucially for contemporary African development.

Ethnic Institutions: Past and Present There was significant heterogeneity in political centralization across African ethnicities before colonization Murdock At the one extreme, there were states with centralized administration and hierarchical organization such as the Shongai Empire in Western Africa, the Luba kingdom in Central Africa, and the kingdoms of Buganda and Ankole in Eastern Africa.

At the other extreme, there were acephalous societies without political organization beyond the village level, such as the Nuer in Sudan or the Konkomba in Ghana and Togo. The middle of the spectrum occupied societies organized in large chiefdoms and loose alliances, such as the Ewe and the Wolof in Western Africa. While these societies lacked statehood, they tended to have conflict resolution mechanisms and a somewhat centralized decision making process Diamond The advent of the Europeans in Africa had limited impact on these pre-existing local political structures.

This was because colonization was with some exceptions quite limited both regarding timing and location Herbst Mamdani argues that, in fact, the European colonizers in several occasions strengthened tribal chiefs and kings via their doctrine of indirect rule.

In the eve of African independence some countries attempted to limit the role of ethnic institutions; however, the inability of African states to provide public goods and broadcast power beyond the capitals, led African citizens to continue relying on the local ethnic-specific structures rather than the national government Englebert Herbst , for example, notes that in Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria and Chad while new states initially marginalized local chiefs, when they realized the extraordinary difficulties in governing rural areas, they quickly invited them back.

There is ample evidence pointing to the ongoing importance of ethnic-specific institutions. First, ethnic leaders and chiefs enjoy considerable support and popularity across local communities e. Baldwin Second, both survey data and case studies show that local chiefs have significant power in allocating land rights.

Analyzing data from the Afrobarometer Surveys, Logan documents that ethnic institutions are instrumental in assigning property rights and resolving disputes. Third, in many countries local leaders collect taxes and provide some basic public goods e.

Fourth, since the early s many countries 15 out of 39 according to Herbst have passed legislation or even constitutional amendments in the case of Uganda and Ghana formally recognizing the role of ethnic institutional structures in settling property rights disputes and enforcing customary law see Baldwin The African historiography has proposed various channels via which ethnic institutions shape contemporary economic activity. First, Herbst and Boone argue that in centralized societies there is a high degree of accountability of local chiefs.